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This thesis contains three essays on globalization with a special focus on historical and
contemporary empirical evidence and labor market effects.
In the first chapter, I study to what extent labor market frictions limit the gains from
market integration. I use an external demand shock to the Spanish economy as a nat-
ural experiment to identify and quantify the effect of labor mobility costs on Spain’s
development. Using newly digitized trade and labor market data, I show that dur-
ing WWI (1914-1918) a large, temporary and sectorally heterogeneous demand shock
emanated from belligerent countries, as a result of which Spain expanded its manufac-
turing employment and exports, while income growth between the north and south in
Spain diverged. To quantify and analyse the role of mobility costs I build and estimate
a multi-sector economic geography model that allows for sectoral and spatial mobility
costs. Spatial mobility costs dominated with an estimated 80% of reallocation of labor
taking place within rather than between provinces. I use the estimated model to calculate
counterfactuals to examine the effects of and interaction between output and input mar-
ket integration: Comparing to the non-shock counterfactual I find that the WWI-shock
increased manufacturing employment by 10%, and induced highly uneven spatial de-
velopment with the north growing 27% faster. The shock constituted a 6% increase in
market size and increased aggregate real incomes by 20%. Lowering mobility costs by
10% increases real income gains from the WWI-shock by an additional 3%, and exceeds
gains in the non-shock scenario, suggesting that labor market integration and output
market integration are complements.
In the second chapter, François de Soyres and I introduce a new framework to evaluate
the effects of regional diversification. We observe that in the presence of mobility fric-
tions workers are exposed to local shocks and that in a multi-sectoral framework this
induces a trade-off: Regions can specialize in their comparative advantage industries,
but at the same time such specialization increases labor market risk due to sector specific
shocks. If mobility costs are high, then welfare effects from lack of diversification can be
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substantial. We measure the segmentation of the French labor market and introduce a
new spatial equilibrium model that incorporates labor market frictions, unemployment,
and mobility cost into an otherwise standard multi-sector economic geography model.
We employ the model to simulate unemployment responses to sector specific shock and
demonstrate the interaction between mobility frictions and matching frictions.
In the third chapter, Konrad Adler and I ask the question to what extent is the set
of products that are available to a country driven by the composition of international
markets? We develop a quantitative framework to determine and map the similarity
between countries from observed market shares of identical products across markets.
We apply our framework to the global movies market where we can abstract from price
competition and observe identical products and their market shares across countries. As
an application we evaluate the hypothesis that the observed large increase in the revenue
share of sequels has been due to shifts in the composition of global demand away
from traditional western markets inducing demand risk and with sequels providing
insurance. While we find substantial shifts in the profit space and lower risk associated
with sequels, our simulations suggest that the risk due to taste heterogeneity in the
movies market is quantitatively insufficient to explain the increase in the revenue of
sequels, suggesting that other forces such as scale economies might be at play.
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Abstract - French
Cette thèse contient trois essais sur la mondialisation avec un accent particulier sur les
preuves empiriques historiques et contemporaines ainsi que seseffets sur le marché du
travail.
Dans le premier chapitre, j’étudie dans quelle mesure les frictions du marché du travail
limitent les gains de l’intégration du marché. J’utilise un choc de demande externe pour
l’économie espagnole comme expérience naturelle pour identifier et quantifier l’effet
des coûts de mobilité des travailleurssur le développement de l’Espagne. À l’aide des
données du commerce et du marché du travail nouvellement numérisées, je montre
que pendant la Première Guerre mondiale (1914-1918), un choc de demande impor-
tant, hétérogène en temps et en secteur a émanédes pays belligérants ce qui a permis
à l’Espagne d’accroître son emploi manufacturier et ses exportations. Dans le même
temps, la croissance des revenus a divergé entre le nord et le sud de l’Espagne. Pour
quantifier et analyser le rôle des coûts de mobilité, je construis et j’estime un modèle de
géographie économique multisectoriel qui permet d’intégrer des coûts de mobilité sec-
toriels et spatiaux. Les coûts de la mobilité spatiale ont dominé avec environ 80 pc de la
réallocation du travail ayant lieu plutôt au sein des provinces qu’entre elles. J’utilise le
modèle estimé pour calculer les contrefactuels pour examiner les effets de l’interaction
entre l’intégration du marché des intrants et des produits : comparé au contrefactuel
non-choc, le choc de la Première Guerre mondiale a augmenté l’emploi manufacturier
de 10 pc et induit un développement spatial très inégal avec le nord ayant une crois-
sance de 27 % plus rapide que le sud. Le choc a constitué une augmentation de 6% de la
taille du marché et une augmentation des revenus réels agrégés de 20%. L’abaissement
de 10% des coûts de mobilité augmente les gains de revenu réel générés par le choc
de la Première Guerre mondiale de 3 pc supplémentaires et dépasse les gains du scé-
nario sans choc ce qui suggère que l’intégration du marché du travail et l’intégration de
marché des biens sont complémentaires.
Dans le deuxième chapitre, François de Soyres et moi introduisons une nouvelle méthodolo-
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gie pour évaluer les effets de diversification régionale. Nous observons qu’en présence
de frictions de mobilité, les travailleurs sont exposés aux chocs locaux et que dans un
cadre multisectoriel cela induit un compromis : les régions peuvent se spécialiser dans
leurs industries d’avantage comparatif, mais en même temps cette spécialisation aug-
mente le risque du marché du travail en raison de chocs propres à leur secteur. Si les
coûts de la mobilité sont élevés, les effets du manque de diversification sur le bien-
être peuvent être considérables. Nous mesurons la segmentation du marché du travail
français et introduisons un nouveau modèle d’équilibre spatial qui incorpore les fric-
tions du marché du travail, le chômage et le coût de la mobilité dans un modèle de géo-
graphie économique multisectoriel standard. Nous utilisons ce modèle pour simuler les
réponses du chômage aux chocs sectoriels et démontrons l’interaction entre les frictions
de mobilité et les frictions du chômage
Dans le troisième chapitre, Konrad Adler et moi posons la question dans quelle mesure
l’ensemble des produits disponibles pour un pays dépend de la composition des marchés
internationaux. Nous développons un cadre quantitatif pour déterminer et cartogra-
phier la similarité entre les pays à partir des parts de marché observées des produits
identiques sur les marchés. Nous appliquons notre cadre au marché mondial des films
où nous pouvons faire abstraction de la concurrence des prix et observer des produits
identiques et leurs parts de marché dans les différents pays. En tant qu’application,
nous évaluons l’hypothèse selon laquelle la forte augmentation observée de la part des
revenus des séquelles est due à des changements dans la composition de la demande
mondiale, plus précisément un éloignement des marchés occidentaux traditionnels, in-
duisant un risque de demande et des suites fournissant des assurances. Alors que nous
trouvons des changements substantiels dans l’espace de profit et un risque inférieur
associé aux suites, nos simulations suggèrent que le risque dû à l’hétérogénéité du goût
dans le marché du film est quantitativement insuffisant pour expliquer l’augmentation
des revenus des suites, suggérant que d’autres forces comme les économies d’échelle
pourraient être en jeu.
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Chapter 1
The Spoils of War: Trade Shocks during




This paper analyzes to what extent labor market frictions limit the gains from market
integration. I use an external demand shock to the Spanish economy as a natural exper-
iment to identify and quantify the effect of labor mobility costs on Spain’s development.
Using newly digitized trade and labor market data, I show that during WWI (1914-1918)
a large, temporary and sectorally heterogeneous demand shock emanated from belliger-
ent countries, as a result of which Spain expanded its manufacturing employment and
exports, while income growth between the north and south in Spain diverged. To anal-
yse the role of mobility costs I estimate a multi-sector economic geography model that
allows for sectoral and spatial mobility costs. Spatial mobility costs dominated with an
estimated 80% of reallocation of labor taking place within rather than between provinces.
I use the estimated model to calculate counterfactuals to examine the effects of and
interaction between output and input market integration: Comparing to the non-shock
counterfactual I find that the WWI-shock increased manufacturing employment by 10%,
and induced highly uneven spatial development with the north growing 27% faster. The
shock constituted a 6% increase in market size and increased aggregate real incomes by
20%. Lowering mobility costs by 10% increases real income gains from the WWI-shock
13
by an additional 3%, and exceeds gains in the non-shock scenario, suggesting that labor
market integration and output market integration are complements.
14
“Spain is today a bundle of small
bodies tied together by a rope of sand.”
Ford (1845), p.2
1.2 Introduction
Why might an economy be trapped at a low level of economic development? Why is the
adjstument to trade liberalization slow and often does not seem to effectively equilibrate
local labor markets across space?1 A common explanation to these questions is that high
mobility costs and low initial gains to the worker from migration might prevent labor
reallocation towards higher productivity sectors and regions. This can in turn limit
the gains from market integration and undermine development, but to what extent
this might be the case is difficult to determine. Understanding and quantifying these
frictions is therefore of primary importance in understanding the obstacles to growth
and structural change in developing countries as well as the welfare effects of trade
liberalization episodes.
However, empirically verifying and quantifying these frictions is challenging, since nei-
ther labor market frictions nor the counterfactual gains from reallocation are directly
observed. This paper overcomes this problem by using a natural experiment where a
foreign demand shock reallocates labor across sectors and space. The reallocation pat-
terns are informative about the sectoral and spatial mobility frictions that inhibit labor
movements even in the absence of a shock. Using the shock in tandem with an eco-
nomic geography model, I show how to estimate the gains from reallocation as well as
the labor market frictions. The key point of this paper is to illustrate how and to what
extent labor market frictions can limit gains from market integration and how this can
be analyzed in a setting where a temporary foreign demand shock reallocates labor by
creating temporary gains that offset adjustment costs. This analysis singles out mobility
costs as a key factor in determining the size of welfare gains from market integration as
well as the spatial distribution.
This study examines a trade shock to the Spanish economy that was caused by the par-
ticipation of Spain’s key trading partners - in particular France - in the first World War
(1914-1918) while Spain remained neutral. Prior to the shock, Spain had experienced a
1The empirical finding that local labor markets only adjust slowly to shocks goes back to Blanchard
and Katz (1992). Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017) show that labor market frictions and slow adjustment
processes can permanently prevent spatial arbitrage.
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Dest: Not War Country
Dest: War  Country
Notes: This figure compares aggregate export levels in constant pre-war prices between destination coun-
tries that participated in WWI and those that did not. To adjust for additional spatial disruptions of
the frontline the belligerent countries are made up of France, Italy and the United Kingdom. The non-
belligerent countries exclude the United States and other later participants of WWI. Data is not available
for the years between 1910 and 1914 therefore a trend line is imputed. The blue shaded area indicates the
period of WWI. The source data are the digitized product-destination level trade statistics.
prolonged period of low GDP growth with little structural change (Prados de la Esco-
sura; 2017). Using newly collected trade data on Spanish product level exports between
1910-1919, as well as labor market data on wages and employment across 48 different
provinces and 24 different sectors before and after the war, I document five stylized facts
about the shock and its impact. Firstly, the trade shock was large, increasing aggregate
exports by 40% at constant prices, and additionally the shock was spatially biased with
most of the aggregate increase being due to higher volumes of trade with belligerent
countries with France being by far the most important destination. Secondly, the trade
shock was asymmetric across sectors. Comparing the trade increase between belligerent
and non-belligerent countries before and during the war, I find that exports to belliger-
ent countries increased in particular for garments, textiles, paper and products from
the heavy industry. Thirdly, sector-level income growth was spatially tilted towards the
French border, with each additional 100km distance to the French border decreasing -
on average - the growth rate by 4 percent. Fourthly, provinces with a higher specializa-
tion in industries favored by the shock experienced faster population growth compared
to their pre-trend, with the opposite being true for provinces with less favorable in-
dustrial composition. Finally, regional industry dynamics depended on the tightness of
the local labor market, indicating an important role for spatial frictions in segregating
labor markets and thus preventing arbitrage between geographically segregated labor
markets.
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The general point that provinces with a prior specialization in sectors that benefited
from the war shock had an opportunity to expand their production can be illustrated
with an example: Already before the War the Sociedad Minera y Metalúrgica de Peñarroya
operated a factory for fertilizer and other chemical goods in Cordoba. During the War
the factory faced higher wages and input prices, but they also experienced a substantial
increase in both domestic and foreign demand, allowing them to expand their output of
superphosphate - a fertilization agent - by 30 percent while expanding their workforce
by 20 percent between 1914 and 1917 (Instituto de Reformas Sociales; 1916). Companies
like the Sociedad Minera make up the individual industries considered in this paper.
With their industrial capacity in place they were well positioned to benefit from the
shock, but had to attract labor from other provinces and sectors. In doing so, industries
found themselves competing with each other to attract workers from the agricultural
hinterland. The focus of this paper is to learn more about the labor market conditions
and frictions that shaped the response to the shock.
I develop a quantitative economic geography model to understand the aggregate impact
of that shock, accounting for the disaggregated geographical margins of adjustments.
The models is consistent with the stylized facts and focuses on taking explicitly into
account the spatial linkages in the labor market and the patterns of comparative ad-
vantage across provinces, as well as the sectoral switching costs within provinces. I
build on the existing quantitative economic geography literature model - as recently
surveyed by Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2016) - and extend a baseline model into
several directions. Labor demand is determined by a framework where multiple sectors
conduct intra-national and international trade subject to geographical frictions. Differ-
ently to most of the commonly used models in the literature, I do not take a stance on
the strength of industry level scale economies. Rather, the patterns of comparative ad-
vantage across space and sectors are partially endogenous, with higher labor densities
translating into productivity gains, depending on the strength of a set of sector specific
parameters that determine industry level scale economies. The adopted models - first
introduced into the international trade literature by Kucheryavyy et al. (2016) - can be
represented by a tractable log linear gravity formulation and is consistent with a Ricar-
dian multi-sectoral trade model with external scale economies, but also nests multiple
other canonical models currently used in the literature, depending on the interpretation
and values of the parameters.
Labor supply is determined by a nested discrete choice framework where workers first
make a decision about reallocating across space subject to incurring switching costs,
and then upon arrival in the new province sort into sectors. A two-staged sequence of
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Notes: This figure reports the aggregate export composition in sectoral terms. The product level trade has
been aggregated to sector level trade data to match the level of aggregation of the labor market panel.
The total value of exports for each section in 1910 as well as the mean exports for 1915/1916 is reported.
The source data are the digitized product-destination level trade statistics.
preference shocks from a Fréchet distribution make the framework tractable. Two kinds
of switching costs are introduced: Firstly, workers who leave a sector incur a switching
cost that is specific to the sector and proportional to the expected utility of its destina-
tion, secondly, a worker who reallocates to a different province incurs a switching cost
that scales with distance. This framework extends the commonly used economic geog-
raphy models by allowing for stickiness in employment at the sectoral and provincial
level - a key feature of the data. At the same time the number of parameters that is
being introduced is limited.
I then show how the structure of the model and the exogenous variation due to the nat-
ural experiment can be combined to obtain credible estimates for structural parameters
that pin down the gains from reallocation. The general intuition for my estimation strat-
egy is that benchmark economic geography models can be inverted to obtain a unique
set of province-sector specific market share shifters. This is related to inverting market
shares to obtain mean utilities when estimating demand in differentiated product de-
mand markets as recently applied in the trade literature in Adao et al. (2017). These
market share shifters are structurally related to prices adjusted for the curvature of the
demand function. In a large class of commonly used economic geography models the
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responsiveness of this price measure to wages is directly informative about how trade
patterns respond to wage changes, and the responsiveness with regard to industry scale
is informative about scale effects.
More specifically, my approach can be described as follows: Conditional on specifying
the strength of geographical frictions in input markets, the structure of the model to-
gether with income data can be used to solve for the origin-specific prices. The strategy
behind this is that economic geography models allow to decompose total sectoral in-
come into two parts, a first determinant of income that is due to proximity to lucrative
destination markets, and a second part that describes how given market acess lower
marginal costs translates into a higher captured trade share across all locations, with
this part being theoretically interpreted as an origin-specific price and is empirically re-
lated to the origin fixed effect in a gravity equation. These origin specific prices can be
regressed on (log) wages and (log) employment sizes of sectors to obtain elasticities that
describe how changes in wages and sectoral employment translate into higher trade
shares and thus higher incomes. The elasticity with regard to wage changes is com-
monly referred to as trade elasticity, while the other elasticity determines scale effects. I
will refer to it as scale elasticity in the remainder of the text.2 An obvious problem in
this estimation is the endogeneity of wages and labor densities. I utilize instruments
that effectively exploit differential shock exposure across provinces interacted with dif-
ferences in labor market tightness to estimate the parameters. A challenge is that wage
and labor changes are correlated, thus differential variation is needed to distinguish the
independent effect of each variable. Labor market tightness induces variation in the
extent to which the shock is being absorbed into wages or employment levels, making
it possible to identify the trade and scale elasticity.
The estimated parameters point to the presence of decreasing returns to scale in the
medium run, effectively limiting the immediate gains from reallocating labor in the
absence of the shock. Similar estimates for scale economies over a 10-year horizon in-
dicate that decreasing returns vanish over the long(er) run. The estimation also gives
insights into the performances of a broad class of economic geography models in cap-
turing adjustment patterns. Specifically, the fit of the regression expresses how much
of the observed variation in residual income shifters can be explained by the endoge-
nous mechanism provided by the model. The model can explain half of that residual
variation.
2Note that this elasticity does not correspond to an output scale elasticity, but rather combines how
scale translates into productivity gains which translate into lower prices and thus into higher market
shares across all trading partners where the responsiveness of the trade growth depends on the trade
elasticity.
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For the estimation of labor market frictions the structure of the model is combined with
additional data. Usually such an estimation requires flows of workers across space and
sectors. However, in a historical context this type of data is rarely available. I show
how to estimate labor market frictions in the absence of such data. The structure of
the model allows for a conveniently separable estimation of geographical and sectoral
frictions. Geographical frictions are being estimated by fitting the model to additional
data available in the censuses. The data decomposes the stock of residents along their
place of birth and is available in 1920 and 1930. Following Silvestre (2005), comparing
the stocks between 1920 and 1930, I can obtain net migration rates between provinces,
thus providing implicitly geographical information to estimate the impact of distance
on migration flows. The estimation itself is a minimum distance estimation that fits the
geographical stage of the labor supply model to the data.
In order to estimate sectoral switching costs I fit the model to changes in labor market
conditions at the province-sector level from before to after the war. A key concern is
that migration decisions were made during the war based on wage dynamics that are
not available. I overcome this data limitation by using the estimated labor demand
model together with the trade shock to simulate unobserved wages during the war
and estimate sectoral frictions consistent with those wages. As has been pointed out
by Silvestre (2005), levels of internal migration during that period were markedly low,
amounting to decennial net flows of less than 5 percent out of the population. Consistent
with that, the estimated model indicates high frictions to labor mobility across sectors
and in particular across space, implying similarly low levels of migration with less than
3 percent moving over the 6 year period that is being considered.
As a result of the estimation I obtain simulated reallocation patterns of labor that are
consistent with the changes in labor market conditions due to the war. The implied re-
allocation patterns strongly suggest that spatial frictions dominate sectoral adjustment
frictions, with 83 percent of the adjustment happening across sectors within provinces,
rather than between provinces. Finally, I use the estimated model to obtain the coun-
terfactual evolution of the Spanish economy in the absence of the World War I shock.
This exercise shows that the War increased the overall size of the manufacturing sector
by 13 percent, while shifting the national industry composition towards more advanced
industrial sectors such as chemicals, metal works, textiles and garments. The model can
also be used to calculate changes in nominal income in the counterfactual. As suggested
above, during the War Spain experienced a differential growth pattern between north-
ern provinces (defined as above Madrid in terms of proximity to France), and southern
provinces. Northern provinces experienced around 30 percent larger (nominal) income
20
growth than southern provinces. The counterfactual without the War indicates only a
minimal spatial gradient of 4 percent, residual productivity trends can explain a further
15 percent with the reamining 11 percent being attributed directly to the War. Since the
model only allows a parametrically limited channel this can be understood as a lower
bound for the effect of the War shock on spatial inequality.
The current study implies a tentative explanation for the lack of development prior to
the shock. The presence of decreasing returns in the short run suggest that even if
labor reallocation took place it would not generate a fortuitous circle of productivity
gains, higher wages and further reallocation. Rather sectoral productivity would be on
average decreased as a result of employment growth and only recover in the medium
run. Such dynamics in productivity gains would inhibit structural change, especially
when combined with a high level of labor market frictions. If furthermore workers
reside in low productivity sectors in provinces that are distant from the provinces that
feature highly productive sectors then the high level of spatial labor market frictions is
particularly prohibitive. In the Spanish case, the analysis seems to suggest that the pre-
shock wage differential between the industrializing North and the agricultural South
was insufficient to surmount spatial labor market frictions. An additional obstacle to
reallocation might be present if workers do not respond effectively to individual sectors’
wage dynamics but rather make migration decisions based on the general appeal of
provinces as a whole - an approach that is implicit in the two stage labor supply model
formulated in the current study and is consistent with the data.
This interaction between decreasing returns and labor market frictions can actually be
beneficial in the presence of the shock. Labor market frictions effectively lock in labor
in new sectors until the decreasing returns vanish, inducing a delayed industrial dy-
namism as a response to the shock that can be related to the economic take off observed
in Spain in the 1920s, long after the shock of the War had faded away.
The current setting has three distinct advantages that make the analysis possible. Firstly,
the shock is large as well as spatially and sectorally asymmetric and plausibly exoge-
nous towards prior industrialization patterns in Spain. This provides a large amount of
independent variation that allows to identify the parameters. Secondly, there is prior
substantial variation in sectoral specialisation across cities, allowing for an uneven im-
pact of the shock across space. Finally, the policy response was limited. During the War
the central government in Madrid was dominated by the land-based oligarchy, who
took little interest in the economic needs of the business community in Catalonia or
the Basque country (Harrison; 1978). Policy remedies only came late and in a limited
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form.3
Related Literature This paper contributes to a growing literature that looks at how in-
dustries and regions within countries might respond to an external shock. What sets the
current paper apart is that it looks at a natural experiment that affected the whole econ-
omy while also accounting for the sectoral dynamics. As such it is a convenient setting
to shift the focus towards the effect of labor market frictions and scale economies as well
as their interaction. In doing so, this paper brings together different aspects that have
been looked at separately before. One of these aspects is the endogenous productivity
response to trade changes and how that in turn affects industry dynamics as in Juhasz
(2017). She studies how temporary import protection can induce import substitution
and productivity improvements in the textile industry during the Napoleonic blockade.
In the current setting the model allows for endogenous productivity responses in a more
abstract way as a function of the observable scale of employment.
Another aspect is how trade shocks can fuel differential population dynamics between
cities and provinces creating persistent differences. This has been explored before by
Hanlon (2014) in the case of a negative supply shock caused by the U.S. Civil War
(1861-1865) which dramatically reduced the cotton imports to the English cotton textile
industry. This differentially affected cities that were more specialised in that industry
compared to those that were not. The same effect is present in the current setting,
but crucially the data in combination with the structure allows us to examine the labor
market interactions across multiple sectors and provinces, granting valuable insights on
how labor market frictions shape regional dynamics as a response to the shock. Further-
more, as suggested above, the combination of labor market frictions and productivity
dynamics suggest an interesting perspective on delayed and to some degree persistent
effects of external shocks.
Finally, some of the findings in this paper are reminiscient of a study conducted by Dix-
Carneiro and Kovak (2017). They examined Brazil’s regional dynamics as a result of
trade reforms and trade liberalization and find slow adjustment and steadily increasing
divergent trade effects driven by a mechanism where high labor market frictions and
slow capital accumulation drive the adjustment pattern. Their empirical and theoretical
setting is very different: While they focus on a permanent change in the trade envi-
3For example only in 1917 did the Spanish government introduce a law for the protection of new industries
and the extension of existing ones earmarking 10 million pesetas for the use of industries falling far short
of the demand of the industry lobby to establish a foreign exchange bank and a commission house to
faciliate the financing of exports instead.
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ronment of a country, I focus on how a temporary shock can reallocate inputs across
provinces and sectors and the analysis is more focused on counterfactuals employing
an extended quantitative spatial equilibrium model. However, some of their results are
reflected in the current paper, such as the prolonged effect of the shock as well as the
limited labor mobility across space.
Secondly, the paper adds to the quantitative economic geography literature as recently
surveyed by Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2016). I contribute by showing how to adapt
a baseline economic geography paper to examine reallocation patterns of labor by ac-
counting for several key aspects of the data. Firstly, the model is more flexible with
regard to the presence of productivity returns to scale, which are important in deter-
mining the gains from reallocating labor. Secondly, the proposed model manages to
match the observed persistence of employment at the province and sector level de-
spite large wage differentials, by introducing sectoral and spatial labor market frictions,
making it possible to compute unobserved patterns of reallocation and allowing to dis-
tinguish within and between provincial adjustments. A key underlying theme of the
current work is how to combine sufficient structure to augment the paucity of the his-
torical data. A constraint is that a model with rich spatial interactions usually requires
flow data to infer the structural parameters and to disentangle different labor market
frictions. I demonstrate how to leverage the structure of the model to estimate its pa-
rameters, relying on a separate treatment of labor demand and labor supply as well as
a convenient separation of spatial and sectoral labor market frictions.
Finally, the paper adds to the literature on Spanish economic history by showing that
the WWI shock had an important impact on the Spanish economy, not necessarily by
creating large output and productivity gains directly, but by reallocating factors across
space and sectors to provide the preconditions for an economic take-off in the 1920s.
As such it is a middle ground between the two opposing views in the literatue. The
established view, represented by Roldan and Delgado (1973), interprets the war as a
large turning point for economic development. Using his own constructed GDP series,
Prados de la Escosura (2016) emphasises that the World War shock actually decreased
GDP per head and instead he points towards the 1920s as a much more important
decade for Spain’s development. My analysis implicitly connects the two events by
pointing towards the reallocation of labor across sectors as a fertile ground for capital
fuelled growth in the 1920s.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.3 discusses the histori-
cal background, describing both the situation in Spain before the War and during the
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War. Section 1.4 describes the various data sources as well as the construction of the
labor market panel that underlies most of the analysis. Section 1.5 gives reduced form
evidence on the trade shock and its effect on regional population dynamics. Section
1.6 describes the theoretical model that guides the estimation and analysis. Section 1.7
then proceeds with describing the estimation procedure. In Section 1.8 I then use the
quantatitative model to simulate Spain in the absence of the War before discussing the
results. Finally, in section 3.7 I conclude.
1.3 Historical Background
This section describes the historical circumstances. The first part gives an overview of
the state of the Spanish economy towards the beginning of the war. The second section
gives an overview of the historical circumstances of the World War itself and how Spain
itself was connected to it.
1.3.1 Spanish Economy at the beginning of the 20th Century
After missing the first wave of the industrial revolution in the first half of the 19th
century (Harrison; 1978), the Spanish economy underwent a period of rapid industrial-
ization in the second half of the 19th century, fuelled by market integration due to the
expansion of the railroad network which in turn resulted in the devolution of industrial
capacity to the peripheral provinces with the cotton industry in Catalonia and Met-
allurgy in the Basque country developing especially rapidly (Nadal; 1975). However,
industrialization soon came to an early halt with the census data showing little increase
in industrial employment from 1887 onwards as can be seen in figure 1.6. This is also
mirrored by very low GDP per head growth rates averaging 0.6 percent between 1883-
1913 (Prados de la Escosura; 2017). Some authors attribute the low levels of growth
to limited demand for manufacturing goods domestically as well as little capacity to
compete with goods from countries such as Germany, France and the UK that are more
advanced in terms of their industrialization (Harrison; 1978).
As a result, at the beginning of the 20th century, the industrial sector barely continued
to expand and Spain remained at a low level of industrial development. According
to census data, in 1900 roughly 70% of the working population worked in agriculture
and only 12.5% worked in industrial/manufacturing sectors. Industrialization only pro-
ceeded slowly, with the industrial sector only growing marginally in total employment
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by 3%, adding a little bit less than 40,000 jobs nation-wide in the first decade of the
century. At that time, the largest share of the industrial sector was made up by sectors
associated with primary goods, such as the exploitation of mines or the production of
construction material.
In terms of the spatial distribution of the population, most of the population was
still concentrated in predominantly rural and agricultural areas such as Andalucia4 or
Castilla y Leon5. However, looking beyond the larger regional aggregation and looking
at individual provinces, it is precisely such major urban centres such as Oviedo, Va-
lencia, Bilbao, Madrid and Barcelona that increasingly attracted and concentrated the
Spanish population. The provinces that contained these urban centres tended to con-
centrate most of the industrial activity as can be seen by the map in figure 1.7 indicating
the spatial distribution of manufacturing employment. While internal migration was
perenially low, with net migration amounting to less than 5% of the population before
1920, the two largest cities, Barcelona and Madrid, tended to nevertheless attract a large
share of agricultural workers from other provinces, making them unique magnets for
migrants around 1900 (Silvestre et al.; 2015).
The industrial structure of those urban centres was heterogenous. For example, Barcelona
was highly specialised in the cotton textile industry, while Valencia specialized in gar-
ments. Because of natural endowments mining and associated downstream industries
dominated in Oviedo and Jaen. The Basque country had an early advantage in the
heavy metal industries, featuring numerous Martin-Siemens open hearth furnaces for
steel production as well as other installations. This degree of agglomeration of specific
industries even at this early stage of industrialisation suggests some degree of agglom-
eration externalities.
In terms of external markets, at the end of the 19th century, (former) colonies and
other Latin American markets played a particularly important role, while after the loss
of the colonies Spain’s exports shifted more towards European countries with France
and Great Britain taking up the biggest share of exports. Most of the exports were raw
materials or agricultural products consistent with the low developmental status of Spain
at the time as depicted in figure 1.2. In general Spain ran a trade deficit for most of the
beginning of the 20th century except for the short period under consideration in this
paper.
4Andalucia comprises eight provinces: Almería, Cádiz, Córdoba, Granada, Huelva, Jaén, Málaga and
Seville, with major industrial activity located in Seville and Mining employment in Huelva
5Castilla y Leon comprises nine provinces: Avila, Burgos, Leon, Palencia, Salamanca, Segovia, Soria,
Valladolid and Zamora with major industrial activity centred in Valladolid.
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In summary, it can be stated that at the beginning of the 20th century Spain was a
predominantly agricultural economy with a low level of industrial activity and while
there was some rural urban migration, there was in general little dynamism towards
further industrialisation.
1.3.2 The Spanish Economy and World War I
The assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 by Yu-
goslavist revolutionaries, triggered a series of declarations of Wars that set off the first
World War on 28 July 1914, with the allied powers spearheaded by France, the British
Empire, Russia, and later on the United States, fighting the central powers, composed of
the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and other co-belligerents.
The consensus is that a conflict limited in terms of duration and extent was expected,
but instead it would become one of the largest wars in history, spreading across all
major populated continents and lasting until 11 November 1918.
At the onset of the war Spanish society was divided into two opposing camps, with
liberal fractions supporting the allied powers, and the remainder of the population sup-
porting the central powers. However, a participation in the war itself was not considered
feasible (Harrison; 1978), so Spain remained neutral throughout the war.
The effects of the first World War on the Spanish economy are well documented in the
reports by the Instituto de Reformas Sociales (Instituto de Reformas Sociales; 1916). They
can be broadly summarised into two categories. Firstly, the war brought about oppor-
tunities to provide war materials to the belligerent nations. This spawned increased
demand for textiles, garments, and for the heavy metal industry. Secondly, a lack of
British, French and German competition in the home market provided an opportunity
for domestic producers to produce import substitutes. The report mentions new facto-
ries that produced goods as varied as supplies for cars, paper folders, perfumes, small
machinery, lightbulbs and others. I will examine the effect in more detail in the reduced
form section below.
1.4 Data
Labor Market Panel Data The main source for labor market data is an industry sur-
vey that covers the years 1914, 1920, 1925 (Ministerio de Trabajo; 1927). This industry
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survey was published by the Ministery for Labor and Industry and is based on surveys
conducted at all public firms and large private enterprises in cities that are larger than
20,000 inhabitants (Casanovas 2004). It covers 23 different industries6 and 48 different
provinces.7
While the industry survey covers a large range of the manufacturing sector, it does not
give further information on the remaining economy. As mentioned before, a crucial
feature of the Spanish economy was a large agricultural sector. In order to account for
that, I digitized the occupation-province specific section of the census for 1900, 1910,
1920 and 1930. I use the 1920 data on agricultural employment8 to augment the 1920
data.9 For the 1914 data, I use the 1910 province specific agricultural employment
data and extrapolate by calculating province specific fertility trends until 1914. Finally,
I use data contained in the official Spanish statistical yearbooks on province specific
agricultural mean wages for 1915 and 1920.
Trade Data The trade data is taken from annual trade records released by the Spanish
custom agency. Using crowdsourcing services, I digitized the trade statistics for the
years 1910 and 1914-1919. For those years, the quantity of exports in 383 product cat-
egories across 77 different destination countries are available. Furthermore, the border
agency uses a system of product level prices to obtain total export values. These prices
do not vary throughout the period of consideration and can be interpreted to give the
relative pre-war prices across goods.
6The industries included are called: Books, Ceramics, Chemicals, Construction, Decoration, Electricity,
Food, Forrest, Furniture, Garments, Glass, Leather, Metal Works, Metallurgy, Mines, Paper, Public, Public
Industry, Textiles, Tobacco, Transport, Varias, Wood.
7The census for 1910 lists 49 different provinces. They mostly correspond to the modern administrative
units called provincias - provinces - which are in turn roughly the NUTS3 level administrative units of
Spain. There are some minor differences, e.g. in how different off-continental administrative units are
being treated. For my analysis I drop the Canary islands from the sample since their distance from the
mainland makes it hard to argue that they are similarly integrated as other provinces.
8More specifically I add the Agriculture (Owner) section and the workers in fishery, forrest and agri-
culture together to obtain an aggregate size of the agricultural sector at the time in each province
9When merging the census data with the industry survey, I adjust for the fact that the survey does
not cover the universe of workers, while the census does. In order to maintain the correct relative size of
agriculture to manufacturing sector, I compare the total size of industry employment in the survey data
with the census - with the census potentially accounting for informal employment as well as industries
in smaller villages. On average, the manufacturing employment size of the survey data represents at
least 44% of the manufacturing sector in the census data. I scale the agricultural employment accordingly
when merging the census and survey data.
27
Correspondence In order to construct a correspondence between product-level trade
data and industry-level labor market data, I used an additional publication that lists the
official correspondence between industries and occupations (Instituto Nacional de Pre-
vision Social; 1930), often explicitly stating the associated product as occupation name
for an industry. From that I constructed a correspondence table that matches products
to industries.10 While some products can be uniquely associated to one industry, others
can be at least matched with two industries. In matching exports to industry levels, I
add the export values for those products to both relevant industries.
Migration Data In order to infer labor mobility costs, data on migration flows is nec-
essary. I follow Silvestre (2005) and use the province level data on inhabitants that are
Born in Another Province which is contained in the censuses. For 1920 and 1930 addi-
tional information is available listing not only the stock of migrants which were born
in another province, but their origin province as well. The difference between 1930 and
1920 in the stock of migrants - adjusted for decennial survivability rates - is informative
about net migration. In order to construct net migration, I follow Silvestre (2005) and
use the decennial census survivability rate between 1921-1930, S ≡ 0.86. Net internal
migration can be obtained by constructing the survivability adjusted change in stock of
migrants, i.e.
Internal migrations1930,1920,i,j = BAPi,j,1930 − S × BAPi,j,1920
where BAPi,j,1920 refers to the stock of residents in i who where born in province j in
1920.
Distance Using GIS software, I georeferenced the Spanish railroad network in 1920.
Then, using MATLAB’s internal shortest path function, I obtain bilateral distances be-
tween provincial capitals along the shortest path of the railroad network. In order to
obtain distances to Paris, I augmented the graph with the French railroad network and
further added maritime linkages between important ports in France and Spain. Again
using the shortest path functionality of MATLAB I can obtain the shortest distance along
this transportation network between provincial capitals in Spain and Paris.
10The correspondence table is available upon request.
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Housing The housing expenditure share as well as stock and rental rates can be im-
puted combining different data sources. The statistical yearbooks make available the
number of buildings available in a province as well as the inhabitants and thus the ef-
fective occupancy rate, the inverse of which is the share of a building that is rented by an
average resident. Additionally, average yearly rental expenditure is selectively available
across provinces in the Boletins of the Instituto de Reformas Sociales. This yearly rate can
be adjusted towards an hourly rate in a province, ri. Total expenditure on housing can
be imputed by firstly multiplying the rental rate and the inverse of the occupancy rate
- call this the unit rental rate - with the stock of housing. Calculating total expenditure
on housing as a share of total labor income across all provinces defines the expenditure
share on housing, which I will refer to as δ.
1.5 Reduced Form Evidence
In this section I develop five stylized fact that characterize the nature of shock, as well
as the impact it had on regional development within Spain. The stylized facts will guide
the choice of the model and will inform the empirical estimation.
Stylized Fact 1: The Trade Shock was large & spatially biased The export shock
was large from an aggregate point of view. In 1915 aggregate exports increased by
40% compared to 1914 and stayed at a high level for as long as the war lasted.11 Most
of the increase was due to differential increase of belligerent countries compared to
non belligerent countries as shown in figure 1.1: The trade to belligerent countries
tripled, while trade with non-belligerent countries remained at a relatively low level
and only grew in the later war years above pre-war levels. Most of the increase in
trade with belligerent country stems solely from export increases to France. Since the
trade shock originated mostly from France, provinces close to the French border had a
more favorable position since they facing lower transport costs when shipping towards
France. If transport costs matter, then the fact that most of the increase was due to
France implies a spatial bias in the trade shock.
11This increase is probably underestimated since official statistics kept the price for the calculation of
values of exported goods at a constant level during the decade under consideration, while it is plausible
that increased demand has further increased the price.
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Stylized Fact 2: The Trade Shock was asymmetric across Sectors Most of the in-
creased demand can be associated with war needs, such as Textiles, Garments, Metal
Works and Leather goods which is evident in the shift in the sectoral composition of
exports from Spain to France. However, it is not clear whether these changes in sectoral
trade flows are driven by plausibly exogenous demand side effects or by potentially
endogenous domestic supply side trends. In order to obtain a sector specific measure of
the foreign demand shock, I construct a theoretically consistent measure by leveraging










where Xod,s,t denotes the export level from origin (o) to destination (d) in sector s which
depends on bilateral resistance term, τod, as well as the marginal cost of production in
the origin country, wo,s,t/Ao,s,t, positively on the sectoral expenditure in the destination
country, Ed,s,t and the price index, Pd,s,t, measuring the competitiveness in the destina-
tion market, and where ǫs denotes the sector specific trade elasticity. Constructing the
growth of exports, X̂od,s,t ≡
Xod,s,t
Xod,s,t−1
, and comparing the growth rate across destination














where hat variables refer to changes. In words, this double difference states that export
growth from origin o to destination d compared to export growth from o to some other
destination d ′, X̂od,s,t/X̂od ′ ,s,t, is a function of relative changes in the price index in the
two destination countries, P̂d,s,t/P̂d ′ ,s,t, as well as relative growth in their expenditure lev-
els Êd,s,t/Êd ′ ,s,t. This double difference can be used to isolate destination specific effects,
in particular, the relative changes in the expenditure and competitiveness of one desit-
nation market compared to some other, plausibly unaffected, comparison group.
When calculating this measure for the WWI shock, I compare sectoral export growth
to belligerent countries to non-belligerent countries. However, some adjustments are
necessary to account for secondary effects of the war. First of all, the war made trade
across the frontline and maritime trade after 1917 difficult. Therefore the sample of
belligerent countries that I focus on only includes France, Italy and the United King-
dom and I construct export growth by comparing the mean export levels for 1915/1916
with the baseline export in 1910, thus avoiding additional distortions after 1916 and the
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partial-year war effect of 1914. For the non-belligerent comparison group I exclude bel-
ligerent countries as well as the United States, to avoid any war preparations to pollute
the measure. The sectoral results can be seen in the appendix in figure 1.10. The sectors
that benefited from particularly high levels of demand during the war are Garments,
Glass, Metal Works, Mines, Paper and Textiles. These sectors experienced between 5-
20 times more growth from belligerent countries than they did from non-belligerent
countries.12
Stylized Fact 3: Regional Dynamics exhibited a Spatial Gradient The shock induced
a demand shock that had spatial and sectoral characteristics, but how did the shock
affect regional dynamics? I use the labor market data introduced in the previous section
to construct income growth at the sector-province level. In order to examine whether




= α + β1distancei,Paris + ǫi,s
where Yi,s,1920 is the total labor income of sector s in province i in 1920, that is Yi,s,1920 =
wi,s,1920Li,s,1920 with wi,s,1920 referring to the wage in that province-sector and Li,s,1920
referring to the total number of employees, and finally distancei,Paris refers to the shortest
distance along the railroad network or maritime linkages between the capital of province
i and Paris. The fitted line is depicted in figure 2.3. I find that each additional 100km
distance to Paris translates into 4 percent lower income growth. This stylized fact is also
robust at the sectoral level and controlling for labor market tightness - as proxied by the
own sector size relative to the province size - as well as initial differences in comparative
advantage - as proxied by the sectoral employment share in the national industry - as
can be seen in regression table 1.7.
Stylized Fact 4: Regional Dynamics & Industrial Capacity To understand the dif-
ferential impact that the shock had at the province level, I use the sectoral shocks to
construct an exposure measure to the shock, i.e.
12As can be seen in the table Mining exports to non-belligerent countries all but disappeared in the
period under considerations. According to the historical reports, this is not due to demand factors, but
capacity constraints in Spain, a feature that is not inherent in the standard gravity approach.
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Notes: This figure shows the evolution of average manufacturing employment of most and least exposed
provinces. Most and least exposed provinces are defined as above or below the median value for the
exposure index defined below. The red line indicates the observation after which the WWI shock (1914-





× (gSpain,Bel,s − gSpain,Non−Bel,s) × XSpain,France,s,1914
where gSpain,Non−Bel,s and gSpain,Bel,s refers to the growth rate of exports to non belliger-
ent and belligerent countries respectively as calculated above. The difference is the ex-
cess growth in sector s associated with WWI. The exposure term summarizes therefore
at the provincial level the expected incidence of the trade shock given the pre-existing
industrial capacity within a sector proxied by the employment share in the national sec-
toral employment and given the estimated increase of French exports due to the WWI
shock. In order to examine the impact of this exposure measure on regional dynamics
and in order to illustrate pre trends I rely on additional data from the Spanish popula-
tion censi on manufacturing employment. In order to analyse the responsiveness to the
continuous exposure variable I examine a continuous treatment Diff-in-Diff specification
in the spirit of Acemoglu et al. (2004), i.e.
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ln yit = δi + δt + γ1 × d1920 + (γ2 + ϕ× d1920)× ln disti,Paris + (ϕ1 × d1920 + ϕ2 × δt)× ln Ei + ǫi,t
The left hand side variable, yit is manufacturing employment in province i at time t,
where manufacturing employment is available in 1900, 1910, and 1920, δi refers to the
full set of province specific fixed effects, d1920 is a dummy for the 1920 which is the first
observation after the WWI shock,
Figure 1.3 illustrates the results and the regression results are reported in table ??. The
coefficient of interest is ϕ1 which is the responsiveness of manufacturing employment
towards increases in the exposure measure - which measures a province’s ability to
exploit sector specific shocks given the scale of its prior industrial capacity in the affected
industries. Comparing the 10th to the 90th percentile this gives an estimated effect of
(8.65 − 5.89) ∗ ϕ = 0.19 log points. The regression as well as the figure above point
towards parallel trends prior to the shock, as can be seen by the coefficient ϕ2 which is
not significantly different from zero.
Stylized Fact 5: Local Labor Supply can inhibit Regional Dynamics In the pres-
ence of spatial labor market frictions, which would be consistent with the low level
of decennial internal migration at the time in Spain (Silvestre; 2005), labor supply is
partially localized and must be sourced from other sectors within the same province.
This implies that the larger an industry’s share in the local labor market the more lim-
ited the pool of workers it can source from. Regressing (nominal) income growth on
the sectoral share of total provincial employment before the war which is defined as
Employment Share of Sector in Province) ≡ Li,s,1914
∑r Li,r,1914
, I find that an increase by 1 log
point translates into .1 log points lower nominal growth rates. The linear fitted line can
be seen in figure 1.8. This finding is robust to controlling for comparative advantage as
proxied by the size of the province-sector in the national industry, and level size affect
as proxied for by (log) employment in 1914 of that industry as can be seen in table
1.7.
1.6 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework is informed by the stylized facts shown above. As indicated
by the spatial gradient, spatial frictions in the output and input market will play a
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prominent role, thus shifting the attention towards economic geography models. Fur-
thermore, the setting requires a multi-sectoral model to account for the sectoral hetero-
geneity of the shock. Finally, the last two stylized facts suggest that provinces compete
for labor inputs and that labor supply can be - to some extent - localized. In order to
accommodate that, I will extend the standard economic geography model to account
for a fairly general set of labor market frictions, introducing switching costs that make
labor sticky at the provincial and the sectoral level.
1.6.1 Setting
Consider an economy with a fixed number of I locations indexed by i, j, k ∈ N . Lo-
cations are heterogeneous in their exogenously fixed housing supply, Hi, and their ge-
ographical location relative to one another. Each location produces goods in S sectors
r, s ∈ S . There are only two periods and the initial distribution at time 0 of the popula-
tion across locations and sectors, [Li,s,0]∀i,s, is given.
1.6.2 Labor Demand
Labor demand is being determined by a multi-sector Ricardian model with industry
level economies of scale along the lines of Kucheryavyy et al. (2016), that allows for
intranational trade between provinces within a country and international trade with
foreign countries. The only factor of production is labor. Each country has a repre-
sentative consumer with upper tier Cobb Douglas preferences across housing - with an
expenditure share δ - and industry bundles, with industry specific expenditure shares
given by βr ∈ (0, 1), such that ∑r βr = 1 − δ. Trade costs are of the standard iceberg type
implying that delivering a unit of any good in industry s from province i to province











where ws and Ls refers to the vector of sectoral wages and employment levels across
provinces respectively, Si,s,t is a province-sector specific productivity shifter, wi,s,t are
the province-sector specific wages, and Li,s,t the quantity of labor employed, and τij,s
34
refers to the iceberg trade cost as defined above. Higher labor densities increase pro-
ductivity via the parameter ψs, which in turn increases trade shares mitigated via the
trade elasticity, ǫs, formally being defined as ǫs ≡ −
∂ln(λij,s/λii,s)
∂lnτij,s
. Together the effect can
be summarised as αs ≡ ψs × ǫs which is the elasticity of changes in trade flows as a
response to changes in employment size of a sector, which I refer to as scale elasticity.
Finally, the trade elasticity ǫs also governs the sensitivity of trade flows with regard to
changes in the destination specific marginal cost pricing, in particular if they are driven
by changes in the input cost, that is the local wage, wi,s,t.
The current framework, which allows for industry level economies of scale, is consis-
tent with a Ricardian model with external scale economies but is also sufficiently general
to nest multiple other trade models including trade models that feature internal scale
economies as pointed out by Kucheryavyy et al. (2016).13 Within a given period the
labor allocation is fixed. The static equilibrium can be defined as follows,
Definition 1 (Static Equilibrium). The static equilibrium within a period t, given the labor
distribution, is given by goods market clearing, balanced trade and housing market clearing.
wis,tLis,t = ∑
j
λij,sβsYj,t ∀(s, i) ∈ S ×N (1.1)
Eis,t = ∑
j




∀(i) ∈ N (1.3)
1.6.3 Labor Supply
The initial allocation of households across across locations and sectors, [Li,s,0]∀i,s, is
given. Between the first period - t = 0 - and the second period - t = 1 - Households can
make a decision to move across provinces and sectors. The moving decision is based
on a nested discrete choice, where workers first decide which province to move to - and
implicitly to leave their own sector - and then upon arrival in the province decide which
13As Kucheryavyy et al. (2016) show, the framework can map into multi-sector variants of Eaton and
Kortum (2002), Krugman (1979) and Melitz-Pareto type trade models (Chaney; 2008)
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× κj,t × ιs,t
where ρj represent location specific amenities, rj,t the market clearing rental rate for
housing, Pj,t represents a local price index which aggregates sector level local price in-
dices according to the Cobb Douglas preferences specified above, that is Pi,t = β̃n ∏s P
βs
i,s,t










where µi,s and β̃i are some constants, where Si,s,t is a province-sector specific produc-
tivity shifter, wi,s,t is the province-sector specific wage, and Li,s,t the quantity of labor
employed, and τij,s refers to the bilateral iceberg trade cost, αs is the scale elasticity and
ǫs the trade elasticity.14 Finally, κj,t and ιs,t represent idiosyncratic preference shocks
that capture preference heterogeneity at the micro-level. I adopt the assumption that
they are Fréchet distributed.
Assumption 1. The preference shocks are sequentially drawn and identically and independently
distributed across provinces and sectors according to a Fréchet distribution with respective dis-
persion parameters ν and γ
F(κj,t) = e
−κ−νj,t , ν > 1, F(ιs,t) = e−ι
−γ
s,t , γ > 1
Assumption 1 allows for convenient closed form solutions of the shares of workers
across sectors and space. ν and γ are the respective dispersion parameters and which
will be shown to pin down the responsiveness of migration flows to changes in indirect
utility. A household which in period t is residing in province i and working in sector s
faces the following problem,









































that is she can decide to remain in the current sector and in the current province, change
just the sector, change just the province or change both. Effectively, the worker compares
the indirect utility of remaining in the current province with the expeceted indirect util-
ity of reallocating to any other province subject to incurring a switching cost, where µij
and µs are the geographical and sector specific switching costs that capture the diffi-
culty of switching sectors and provinces.15 The population that remains in a province
is pinned down by the geographical mobility cost µij effectively discounting options
that involve out migration. Similarly, the population that remains in a sector is pinned
down by the sectoral mobility cost µs effectively discounting options that involve sec-
toral switching.
I assume that this decision problem is being done sequentially with the worker first
observing the location specific preference shocks, κt, but not yet knowing the vector of
sector specific preference shocks, ιt. In the first stage the worker forms expectation over
the maximized outcome in the second stage. Given the Frechet distribution it can be
shown that this implicit value has a closed form solution.
Proposition 1. The expectation of the maximization problem over J alternatives, where the
benefit accrued is δi × ǫi and where ǫi is Fréchet distributed with CDF F(x) = e−x
−a























where Γ(·) is the Gamma function.
Proof. See appendix.
This mirrors the implicit value commonly used in nested discrete choice estimations us-
15Different interpretations are possible: For agriculture the sectoral switching cost might absorb some
of the cost of moving to a major urban center, for other sectors they might simply signify the loss of sector
specific human capital. For the geographical part the reallocation cost might absorb the lost utility due to
disrupted social connections, a psychic cost or the actual economic moving cost.
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ing Gumbel distributed additive preference shocks instead of Frechet distributed mul-
tiplicative preference shocks. Based on comparing these implicit values subject to geo-
graphical switching cost that are proportional to the expected utility in the destination
and specific to bilateral pairs of provinces the Household chooses the optimal location
to move towards. Therefore the upper level problem of a worker residing in sector s
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where µij is the bilateral spatial mobility cost, where µii is normalized to 1, and where
the implicit value Ṽi,t+1|s indicates the expected utility obtained after observing the pref-
erence shocks in the second stage and making the utility optimizing decision. Due to
sectoral switching costs the implict value depends on the initial sector the worker is



















An attractive property of this formulation of the labor reallocation problem is that bilat-
eral flows between provinces is primarilily driven by a measure of aggregate attractive-
ness of the destination province rather than specifically tied to sector specific dynamics
within that destination provinces. This is a more realistic choice in a setting where
migrants in faraway provinces have little information about the specific conditions in
specific sectors but might have some information about the general attractiveness of a
destination. Crucially, the key determinant of the direction of migration flows is the rel-
ative size of spatial versus sectoral switching costs, pinning down to what extent labor
adjusts between provinces rather than within provinces. I will return to this point dur-
ing the quantitative analysis. Given the Fréchet distributed preference shocks, standard
properties imply the following closed form for the shares of workers who move across
provinces,
16In the current setting the Fréchet dispersion parameter γ is symmetric across locations, therefore we
can abstract from additional multiplicative term that determines the scale of the expectation, Γ(1 − 1γ ).




















summarises the option value of a person currently
working in sector s and residing in province i, where Ṽt+1|s is the vector of implicit
values Ṽj,t+1|s as defined above, where µij refers to the geographical switching cost, and
where implicit values depend on expected wages, rental rates, price indices and the
sectoral switching cost µs, finally ν defines the elasticity with regard to changes in the
implicit values or alternatively the switching cost.
Conditional on reallocating and upon arrival in the province the worker uncovers her
vector of sector specific preference shocks, ιt and makes a choice selecting a sector.
Again assuming Fréchet distributed preference shocks with dispersion parameter γ, one
can obtain the following closed form for the share of workers that flow into industry r
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s ∑k 6=s w
γ
j,k,t+1
for s = r
where wi,t is the vector of wages in province i and wi,r,t refers to the wage in sector r
and in province i. Since the other determinants of indirect utility enter symmetrically
across all options, they do not affect the sectoral shares. Finally, one can state the flows
from province i and sector r to province j and sector s, as,
σij,sr(Ṽ, w) = σij,sσj,s,r
where Ṽ represents the vector of expected indirect utilities across provinces, and where
province-sector specific flows are separable between, σij,s, that is the bilateral flows
between province i and province j, and the sorting into sector r within province i, σi,s,r.






In order to use the model described in the previous section for a quantitative analysis
of the World War I shock, one needs to obtain estimates of the key parameters. On the
labor demand side, we need to obtain trade elasticities, {ǫs}, scale elasticities, {αs}, and
productivity shifters, {Ai,s}. On the labor supply side we need to estimate switching
costs and geographical and sectoral supply elasticities. The estimation of the param-
eters determining labor demand can be done separately, since changes in the spatial
equilibrium are sufficiently informative to estimate them. Given those estimates we can
then estimate the parameters associated with the labor supply model.
1.7.1 Labor demand
The estimation of the key parameters that determine labor demand relies mainly on
the labor market data - that is wages and employment size for each province-sector.
I demonstrate how to use that data in conjunction with the model structure in order
to estimate the key parameters that determine labor demand. In the first step I use
a structural approach to separate out origin specific marginal cost prices and market
access. In a second step, I then regress the obtained prices on wages and labor densities
to obtain the structural parameters.
Obtaining Origin-Prices



















where the first equation states that total income in province i and sector s, Yi,s, must
equal the cumulative export sales for that sector, that is the sum of all export flows from
the origin province i to any province j, i.e. ∑j Xij,s. Since export flows follow the gravity
structure the second equality follows. The second equation states that total expenditure
in province i on goods from sector s, must equal total incoming export flows from all
origin provinces j, that is ∑j Xji,s. Combining and rearranging, one can obtain a system
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where pǫsi,s refers to the origin prices introduced above. Standard results in economic
geography imply that this equation can be solved to find the unique vector of provincial
origin prices (up to normalization) for each sector, pǫss .
Using the labor market data before and after the war - that is for 1914 and 1920 - and us-
ing the housing market data to construct disposable income across provinces, Eis ≡ βsYi,
one can implement the inversion described in the previous paragraph. In the implemen-
tation, I first calculate the Cobb Douglas expenditure shares as the national income share
of an industry out of aggregate labor income. This is theoretically consistent with one
input economic geography model described above. The housing expenditure share δ
is obtained as described in section 1.4. I use the shortest distance along the railroad
graph between Spanish provincial capitals and furthermore add France as an additional
location, where the distance to France is the shortest distance to Paris across railroad
and maritime linkages. The iceberg transport cost is calibrated to be, τij = distance
−1
ij ,
calibrating the distance elasticity to the canonical value of -1 (Head and Mayer; 2013).
Since I do not have coherent labor market data for France, I only include the total value
of sectoral exports17 as additional demand into the economic geography system.
Price Regression






to obtain a log-linear expression of prices as a function of sector-province employment














where relative changes in origin-prices of sector s in province i, p̃is,t+1p̃is,t , are a function of
relative changes in wages and employment levels in that sector-province and where x̃
17French exports are at the yearly level while the labor market data is in terms of the hourly wage and
only covers a subset of the overall economy of Spain. When introducing the exports into the model I
divide the total value by 54×50 to translate the value into hourly exports. Then I multiply it by the share
of the industry that is represented in the sample, that is .44.
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indicates that the variable x has been normalized relative to a sector-specific baseline
province. The responsiveness of origin prices with regard wages and employment lev-
els is pinned down by the trade elasticity, ǫs, and the scale elasticity αs, respectively.
The scale elasticity itself is combination of productivity externalities and how these pro-
ductivity externalities in turn translate into income gains, that is αs = ψs × ǫs. We can
define the structural residual as ηi,s,t ≡ log
Ãis,t+1
Ãis,t
, which is the unobserved productivity
evolution at the sector-province level. Additionally, I include the full set of province
specific fixed effects δi to control for province specific confounding shocks.
Endogeneity A natural concern is the endogeneity of both wages, wi,s, and employ-




labor demand will increase and move along the upward sloping labor supply curve,
with increases in wages and employment levels as a result. This implies that the model
structure indicates a positive correlation between the residual, ηi,s,t, and the wages and
employment levels, which will in turn induce an upward bias for the estimation of
αs and a downward bias for the estimation of ǫs. The naive OLS results depicted in
table 1.2 shows theoretically invalid negative trade elasticities and large estimates for
the external scale parameter, consistent with the model implied bias. An instrument is
therefore necessary to remedy the situation. The exclusion restriction for any instrument
is that












error as discussed above. The setting is more challenging than a standard endogeneity
problem because of the presence of two - potentially correlated - endogenous variables.
An appropriate instrument needs to induce sufficient independent and differential vari-
ation in the endogenous variables to separately identify their impact on the dependent
variable. The model suggests that labor supply shifters interacted with the incidence of
the shock can serve as a source of such variation. Intuitively, while the foreign demand
shock translates into a labor demand shock that stems from the industries desire to ex-
pand their production, the curvature of local labor supply will determine whether the
additional demand is being absorbed mostly into higher wages or larger sectoral size as
measured by employment. As illustrated in the figures below.
Historical evidence as well as the stylized facts suggest that spatial frictions are high and
that labor supply is highly localized. I exploit this by using the (log) distance to Paris
interacted with the (log) employment share of a sector within a province as a first instru-
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Figure 1.4: Inelastic Labor Supply
                                 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   

















Figure 1.5: Elastic Labor Supply
                                 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   















Notes: The figure illustrates the underlying premise of the instrument. In the presence of two endogenous
- potentially correlated - variables, independent variation is needed that differentially shifts the two
variables. In the current setting a labor demand shock induces an outward shift of the labor demand
curve from LaborDemand to LaborDemand(Shock), inducing an increase in both wages and employment
levels. The extent to which the shock is being absorbed by prices or quantities depends on the curvature
of labor supply. If labor supply is tight - due to a small size of the local labor market - the curve will
be upward sloping and wages will increase rather than employment levels. The opposite is true if labor
supply is highly elastic.
ment, where log(Employment Share of Sector in Province) ≡ log Li,s,1914
∑r Li,r,1914
acts as a labor
supply shifter and is interacted with distance to Paris as a reduced form proxy for dif-
ferences in geographical advantages vis-a-vis the French destination market. A second
instrument is given by a Harris Market Potential measure for the input market leaving




first stages are reported separately in table 1.6 and are sufficiently strong. Furthermore,
there are no apparent pre trends neither along the distance margin nor along the sec-
toral shares as can be seen in the results for a regression that correlates wage growth
prior to the war - that is between 1909 and 1914 - with distance to Paris and sectoral
share, as can be seen in table ??.
Results The results can be seen in the table 1.1. The trade elasticities are theoretically
consistent, positive and of comparable magnitude to sectoral trade elasticities currently
found in the literature, though due to different aggregation and different time periods
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not directly comparable. The scale elasticity, αs, are mostly very imprecisely estimated
with the result that for most sectors one cannot reject the presence of constant returns
to scale, that is αs = 0. However, in some cases αs is significantly different from zero
and negative, indicating decreasing returns to scale in chemicals, mining, metallurgy,
metal works and textiles. These industries tend to require fixed installations, and thus
decreasing returns in those sectors in the short and medium run seem plausible. The
R squared is a natural measure of the fit of the model. To understand why, recall that
prices solve the spatial equilibrium conditions, thus effectively functioning as residual
income shifters, once one controls for market access differences. The R squared then
measures how much of the variation can be explained by the log linear regression.
The fit indicates that the model can explain half of the variation in the residual income
shifter. Additionally, the model including labor densities performs much better than the
model that only accounts for wage effects - as would be the case in the absence of any
scale effects. The model without labor densities can only account for a quarter of the
observed variation. Finally, the same estimation strategy can be used for the changes
in labor market conditions from 1914 to 1925. The estimated scale elasticity, αLRs , is
reported in the table alongside the previous estimates. As can be seen, decreasing
returns are no longer present in the industries in which they were present previously,
suggesting decreasing returns to be a medium term phenomenon rather than a constant
feature of these industries.
1.7.2 Labor supply
The estimation of the labor supply parameters proceeds in two steps and each step relies
on different data sources.
Geographical Frictions
In the first step, I rely on data that shows the decennial change in the number of workers
who live in a certain province but were born in another province, that is BAPi,j,t for a
worker who was born in province i but now lives in province j. The difference in this
stock of foreign born workers, BAPi,j,t − S × BAPi,j,t−1 - adjusted for survivability rate S
as explained in section 1.4 - is informative about the net inflow of foreign born workers,
either directly from the province under consideration or indirectly from other provinces.
The data is adjusted so that the 1920s data shows the same number of total inhabitants
born in a given province as the 1930s data, adding the additional population in their
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origin provinces. Using the closed forms from the previous section I can construct the
model equivalent of this moment. The (estimated) stock of workers born in province i
and currently residing in province k is given by,
ˆBAPi,k,1930 = ∑
j,s
σjk,s(Ṽ1930|s, w) × πi,s,1920 × S × BAPi,j,1920
where ˆBAPi,k,1930 refers to the simulated stock of workers born in province i and cur-
rently residing in province k, πj,r,1920 refers to the industry share of industry r in
province j in 1920 and where the closed form for the share of flows between province j












plicitly, this is assuming that there is no sorting across industries of different groups of
inhabitants, which in the absence on additional information is a necessary assumption.
In the baseline estimation, I assume that wages and price indices follow a random walk.
The geographical switching cost is calibrated as a function of distance that is





where distanceij is the shortest distance across railroad and maritime travelling routes
from the province capital in i to the province capital in j in km. The structural estima-
tion chooses the parameter vector β = (ζ11, . . . , ζ
I
1, ρ1, . . . , ρ
I , ζ2, ν, γ, µ1, . . . , µS) to match
the observed moments, that is minimizing the error between imputed and observed
quantities of workers born in another province,
ηi,j(BAPi,j,1930, β) = BAPi,j,1930 − ˆBAPi,j,1930





where η is the stacked vector of structural errors, ηi,j.
Identification The origin varying scalar, ζ1i , determines the out-province migration
share. Conditional on moving out of a province, the distance between the origin
province and the destination province is informative about how geographical frictions
affect migration flows and thus determines the distance elasticity, ζ2. The incoming
migration to specific provinces above and beyond what is justified by wage differences
informs the province specific amenities, ρi. The responsiveness of in migration to dis-
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persion in wages across sectors within a given province pins down the local supply elas-
ticity, γ, while the response to dispersion of imputed indirect utilities across provinces
informs the estimation of the spatial migration elasticity, ν.
Sectoral Switching Costs
In order to estimate sectoral switching costs, I fit the model to changes in labor market
conditions at the province-sector level from before to after the war. A key concern is
that migration decisions were made during the war based on wage dynamics that are
not part of the available data. In order to overcome this limitation I propose to use the
estimated labor demand model together with sectoral trade data from 1915 to simulate
the market clearing wages in the presence of the World War shock. I proceed by first
using the 1914 data to impute the residual productivities, {Ai,s,1914}, and then feed in
the trade shock to back out the simulated market clearing sectoral wage vectors, ŵs,1915.
Using these sectoral wage vectors as expected wages, and calibrating the spatial friction
to the estimated values from the previous section, I use the closed forms to match the




where L̂i,s,1920 refers to the estimated stock of workers in province i and sector s in 1920,
and Lj,r,1914 refers to the observed size of industry r and province j, and σji,rs(ŵ) is the
closed form for migration flows between province j to province i and sector r to sector
s. Recall that,
σij,rs(Ṽ, ŵ) = σij,sσs,r,j
that is the bilateral migration flows between sectors and provinces is a composite be-
tween outgoing migration between province i and province j in sector s and workers
who upon arrival in province i sort into sector r. The structural error is given by,
ηi,s(β) = Li,s,1920 − L̂i,s,1920
β̂ = arg min
β∈B
η (β) ′ η (β)
where η is the stacked vector of structural errors, ηi,j and where the structural pro-
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cedure chooses β = (µagriculture,1, . . . , µagriculture,I , µ2, . . . , µS, γ) to minimize the distance
between the observed and the estimated employment size of each sector-province ob-
servation. Notice that the parameter vector includes province-specific switching costs
for agriculture. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, the switching costs associated
with agriculture have a natural interpretation that is related to rural-urban migration,
thus also involving some form of within province spatial friction. Since provinces differ
in their size, this needs to be accounted for. Secondly, the changes of the agricultural
sector are quantitatively important to match.
Identification With spatial frictions being calibrated, the size of the sectoral switching
cost, µs, is informed by the persistence of sectoral employment size in the presence of
local wage disparities between sectors. An important caveat is that sectoral switching
costs can only be identified in a scenario where workers do not reallocate despite a
positive wage differential.
Results The results of the migration cost estimation are reported in table 1.8 in the
appendix. Spatial frictions are prohibtively high implying low levels of internal migra-
tion with 2.7 percent of the population reallocating during the fitted period which is a
gross measure. This is consistent with reported decennial net internal migration of 2.8
percent between 1911 and 1920 (Silvestre; 2005). Conditional on migrating distance is
an important determinant with the composite distance elasticity, ζ2 × ν, giving a value
of 2.38. Finally, labor is highly sticky, with a high degree of heterogeneity across sectors.
Agriculture as a sector tends to be especially sticky across all provinces with a high
degree of heterogeneity, nevertheless absolutely speaking agriculture releases most of
the labor. This is to say that wage differentials are so large that high switching costs are
necessary to justify the lack of mobility.
1.8 Quantitative Analysis: Spain without WWI
Implementation Having estimated the parameters that determine both labor supply
and demand, one can now use the model to determine the counterfactual evolution of
the Spanish economy in the absence of the WW1 shock. Since labor flows depend on
the expectations of utilities across province-sectors, and since those utilities themselves
depend on the migration choices - via the scale economies - there is a potential for
multiple equilibria in this class of model, and a necessity for equilibrium selection when
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conducting the counterfactual.18 The baseline results presented here assume that wages
and price indices follow a random walk and therefore are expected to remain at the
level of the initial equilibrium observed in 1914. That is, workers coordinate using
the current wages and price indices. Alternatives to that baseline can be explored.
Conditional on implied reallocation patterns market clearing wages can be calculated
and conclusions about impacts on income evolution can be drawn. In the following I
compare the counterfactual 1920 wages and labor distribution with the observed state
of the economy in 1920.
Sectoral Employment Growth One informative aspect of the counterfactual is to com-
pare the aggregate industry sizes between the two scenarios. The results of such a com-
parison are presented in figure 1.13. The results indicate two important aspects: Firstly,
there is high degree of reallocation from the agricultural sector towards the manufactur-
ing sector, with the manufacturing sector as a whole growing by 1 percent as a result.
A second important pattern is the heterogeneous response within the manufacturing
sector with sectors that were particularly affected by the shock gaining substantially
in size. Amongst those food, garments, textiles and metal works stand out, with the
largest changes taking place in the textile sector.
Regional Employment Growth The same analysis can be conducted looking at province
sizes rather than sectoral sizes. The results are presented in figure 1.16. There are very
small difference in regional growth between the two scenarios, consistent with the find-
ing that most of the adjustment is due to within provincial reallocation rather than
between provincial allocation. Incidentally this is also consistent with a key characteris-
tic of the migration choice framework highlighted above, that is that mgiration decisions
do not respond effectively to individual industry dynamics but rather respond to the
aggregate appeal of a destination, as captured in the estimation by the amenity values.
Those amenities do not change in the counterfactual thus driving the patterns of the
limited migration flows in either scenario.
Spatial Inequality The model can also be used to calculate changes in nominal in-
come aggregated at the sector-province level in the counterfactual. In the data the
spatial gradient described in the reduced form section 1.5 led to a differential growth
18An alternative approach is to bound the possible outcomes by setting up the counterfactual problem
as an MPEC Reguant (2016). This approach is currently being examined but the results are not yet
available.
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pattern between northern provinces (defined as above Madrid in terms of proximity to
France), and southern provinces. Northern provinces experienced around 30 percent
larger (nominal) income growth than southern provinces. The counterfactual without
the War indicates only a minimal spatial gradient of 4 percent, residual productivity
trends can explain a further 15 percent with the reamining 11 percent being attributed
directly to the War. Since the model only allows a parametrically limited channel this
can be understood as a lower bound for the effect of the War shock on spatial inequality.
The exact patterns of incidence can be seen in map 1.16, indicating the differences in
nominal income between the two scenarios which is indicative about the extent to which
individual provinces managed to capture and monetize the demand shock effectively.
The spatial gradient is visible, but is mitigate by provincial heterogeneity in sectoral
specialization.
Mobility costs and Market Integration Finally, the model can be used to conduct
counterfactuals on the real income levels if one allows for lower mobility costs. In order
to simulate a reduction in the spatial mobility cost, I lower the bilateral travel distance
between province capitals by 10%. Lowering mobility costs by 10% increases real income
gains from the WWI-shock by an additional 3%, increasing the aggregate gains in real
income from 20% to 23.59%. This is larger than the welfare gains from lower migration
costs in the counterfactual non shock scenario where welfare would have only increased
by 2.4%. This suggests that labor market integration and output market integration are
complements. The reason why labor market integration and output market integration
are complements is due to the fact that a more fluid labor market increases labor supply
to the most productive industries and weakens localized competition for labor supply
that in the presence of mobility cost can limit the extent to which the shock can be
effectively exploited.
1.9 Conclusion
My primary interest was to examine to what extent labor market frictions can inhibit
economic development of a country. I used a newly collected historical dataset that
combines trade and labor market data, to examine a unique historical episode: A tem-
porary trade shock to a developing economy that prior to the shock only underwent
slow structural transformation. I demonstrated the key features of the shock and its
impact on regional development within Spain: The shock was temporary, sectorally
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heterogeneous, large and spatially biased. It induced spatially tilded regional devel-
opment and affected provinces heterogeneously depending on their initial industrial
specialization. I built a quantitative economic geography model that can account for the
dynamic response to the temporary shock. A baseline economic geography model is
extended to be better suited to match the regional dynamics of a temporary shock, by
introducing and estimating labor market frictions that make employment sticky at the
sectoral and provincial level as well as allowing for endogenous productivity feedbacks
to determine the immediate productivity gains from reallocation.
An interesting aspect of the current work is that limited historical data can be com-
plemented with structural models to improve both the estimation of objects of interest
and in order to get further insights into phenomena that are not directly observed -
as was done in this paper by obtaining unobserved sector-province labor reallocation
patterns consistent with estimated migration costs and observed sectoral employment
sizes.
The analysis suggests that high levels of labor market frictions and low immediate
returns to reallocation due to the absence of scale economies and even the presence
of decreasing returns in some industries prevented the Spanish economy from devel-
oping before the War. The shock induced reallocation across space and particularly
between sectors within provinces, thus creating the fruitful preconditions for an eco-
nomic take-off in the following decade. Finally, the analysis suggests that welfare gains
from (output) market integration depend on the extent to which input markets are in-
tegrated.
This suggests four important conclusions: Firstly, labor market frictions are of primary
importance for analysing (spatial) development of a country or the lack thereof. Sec-
ondly, the relative size of different labor market frictions determines the pattern of
development as well as the extent to which spatial arbitrage is possible between space
and between sectors, making a quantitative understanding of these frictions important,
in particular when analysing patterns of spatial inequality. If spatial mobility costs are
a reasonable concern in a developing country then policy makers need to take into ac-
count the distribution of labor as well as the spatial unevenness of the development
process. Finally, labor market integration and output market integration ought to be





Table 1.1: Estimation Results - Labor demand parameters - Long Run
Industry αs Std Err αLRs Std Err ǫs Std Err
Agriculture 1.20 (2.60) −0.93 (1.55) 4.71∗∗∗ (1.74)
Books −0.19 (1.08) 0.10 (1.54) 5.17∗∗∗ (1.84)
Ceramics −0.04 (1.32) 2.04∗∗ (0.91) 5.34∗∗ (2.12)
Chemicals −0.76 (1.39) −0.97 (1.09) 5.18∗∗∗ (1.85)
Construction 0.92 (1.54) 0.11 (0.80) 4.22∗∗ (1.99)
Decoration 0.84 (1.03) −0.49 (1.51) 5.53∗∗∗ (2.03)
Electricity 0.00 (1.24) −0.17 (1.01) 5.47∗∗∗ (1.89)
Food 0.05 (1.13) 0.72 (1.25) 4.58∗∗ (1.80)
Forest 1.16 (4.71) −6.10 (10.16) 4.84 (3.30)
Furniture 0.38 (0.87) 0.21 (1.19) 5.38∗∗ (1.92)
Garments 0.28 (1.06) 0.41 (0.97) 4.44∗∗∗ (1.79)
Glass 1.51 (2.92) 0.78 (1.42) 5.96∗∗∗ (2.22)
Leather 1.79∗ (1.07) 1.58 (1.52) 5.92∗∗∗ (1.88)
Metal Works −0.66 (0.88) 0.39 (1.43) 4.43∗∗∗ (1.80)
Metallurgy −0.98 (1.74) −0.85 (1.75) 5.54∗∗∗ (1.73)
Mines −2.34∗ (1.40) 2.80 (4.95) 5.99∗∗∗ (1.83)
Paper −3.06∗ (1.89) −6.86 (4.07) 3.21∗ (1.93)
Public 1.34 (6.33) 1.61 (1.61) 5.37 (3.71)
Public Industry 22.21 (23.41) 1.18 (1.34) 11.99 (10.54)
Textiles −0.88 (0.95) 0.48 (1.39) 4.04∗∗ (1.75)
Tobacco 10.36∗ (6.10) 2.78 (5.55) 1.43 (2.68)
Transport 1.51 (1.53) 0.71 (1.37) 4.78∗∗∗ (1.85)
Varias −0.95 (1.64) −3.36 (3.77) 4.68∗∗ (1.97)




∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: This table reports both the short run and long run results from the structural estimation of the
labor demand parameters. The parameter ǫs refers to the trade elasticity, αs for the composite external
economies of scale parameter as discussed in the theory section. Additionally, αLRs is reported, which
is the corresponding scale elasticity if estimated for the 1914/1925 time frame instead of the 1914/1920
timeframe. The estimates are obtained via 2SLS instrumenting for employment size of sector s in province
i, Li,s and wages wi,s, using logdistancei,Paris × log(Employment Share of Sector in Province) as a first in-
strument, where log(Employment Share of Sector in Province) ≡ Li,s,1914
∑r Li,r,1914
works as a labor supply shifter
and is interacted with distance to Paris as a reduced form proxy for differences in geographical ad-
vantages vis-a-vis the French destination market. A second instrument is given by a Harris Market
Potential measure for the input market leaving own size out as a labor supply shifter, constructed as
LMAi,s = ∑j 6=i,r 6=s
1
distancei,j
Lj,r. The first stages for the 1914/1920 estimates are reported separately in ta-
ble 1.6. The estimation is obtained on the sample that drops the 1% smallest industries, thus avoiding
large leverage of outliers on estimates due to small measurement error in employment sizes and wages.
Standard errors are obtained via bootstrap.
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Table 1.2: Structural Estimation: Naive OLS
Industry αs T-Stats ǫs T-Stats
Agriculture 0.91∗∗∗ (6.97) −1.20∗∗∗ (35.61)
Books 1.00∗∗∗ (8.39) −0.99∗∗∗ (13.16)
Ceramics 1.07∗∗∗ (9.08) −0.59∗∗∗ (6.95)
Chemicals 0.85∗∗∗ (9.79) −0.37∗∗∗ (5.35)
Construction 1.18∗∗∗ (11.89) −1.34∗∗∗ (23.71)
Decoration 1.10∗∗∗ (12.71) −1.07∗∗∗ (16.33)
Electricity 0.90∗∗∗ (8.12) −0.61∗∗∗ (6.99)
Food 1.15∗∗∗ (10.28) −1.29∗∗∗ (24.86)
Forest 0.87∗∗∗ (9.83) −3.30∗∗∗ (22.60)
Furniture 1.04∗∗∗ (9.86) −0.98∗∗∗ (16.02)
Garments 1.09∗∗∗ (8.09) −1.20∗∗∗ (16.36)
Glass 0.99∗∗∗ (5.80) −1.05∗∗∗ (12.06)
Leather 1.03∗∗∗ (13.11) −0.93∗∗∗ (13.77)
Metal works 1.04∗∗∗ (10.69) −1.08∗∗∗ (16.20)
Metallurgy 0.90∗∗∗ (14.32) −0.03 (0.46)
Mines 1.13∗∗∗ (23.13) 0.77∗∗∗ (13.56)
Paper 1.22∗∗∗ (4.56) −1.24∗∗∗ (14.34)
Public 0.99∗∗∗ (5.31) −1.81∗∗∗ (11.19)
Public Industry 0.61∗∗∗ (6.26) −2.80∗∗∗ (25.83)
Textiles 1.06∗∗∗ (9.65) −1.24∗∗∗ (17.07)
Tobacco 1.02∗∗∗ (8.02) −1.29∗∗∗ (14.60)
Transport 1.06∗∗∗ (10.10) −1.06∗∗∗ (15.39)
variants 0.98∗∗∗ (3.61) −0.89∗∗∗ (6.91)




∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table reports the results of estimating the structural equation 1.4 without correcting for the
endogeneity of wages and employment size of a sector. The estimation procedure is OLS. The dependent











treated=1 × ldist 0.00262 (0.02)
treated=1 × lexp 0.0686∗ (2.41)




t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table reports the results of the diff-in-diff regression described in section







t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table reports the results of a regression Source: Labor inspections (1909-1914)
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Table 1.5: Spatial Gradient: Sectoral Estimates
Yi,s,1920
Yi,s,1910
Agriculture × log(DistanceParis) -0.619∗∗∗ (-3.49)
Books × log(DistanceParis) -0.754∗∗∗ (-4.01)
Ceramics × log(DistanceParis) -0.671∗∗∗ (-3.55)
Chemicals × log(DistanceParis) -0.647∗∗∗ (-3.44)
Construction × log(DistanceParis) -0.650∗∗∗ (-3.59)
Decoration × log(DistanceParis) -0.717∗∗∗ (-3.76)
Electricity × log(DistanceParis) -0.695∗∗∗ (-3.66)
Food × log(DistanceParis) -0.671∗∗∗ (-3.70)
Forest × log(DistanceParis) -0.793∗∗∗ (-4.20)
Furniture × log(DistanceParis) -0.737∗∗∗ (-3.90)
Garments × log(DistanceParis) -0.669∗∗∗ (-3.70)
Glass × log(DistanceParis) -0.723∗∗∗ (-3.70)
Leather × log(DistanceParis) -0.697∗∗∗ (-3.70)
Metal Works × log(DistanceParis) -0.675∗∗∗ (-3.71)
Metallurgy × log(DistanceParis) -0.668∗∗∗ (-3.57)
Mines × log(DistanceParis) -0.653∗∗∗ (-3.60)
Paper × log(DistanceParis) -0.700∗∗∗ (-3.58)
Public × log(DistanceParis) -0.735∗∗∗ (-3.66)
Public Industry × log(DistanceParis) -0.713∗∗∗ (-3.64)
Textiles × log(DistanceParis) -0.678∗∗∗ (-3.72)
Tobacco × log(DistanceParis) -0.802∗∗∗ (-4.19)
Transport × log(DistanceParis) -0.664∗∗∗ (-3.66)
Varias × log(DistanceParis) -0.737∗∗∗ (-3.98)





t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table reports the results of a regression correlating nominal income growth between 1920
and 1910 at the sector province level with the (log) distance from the provincial capital to Paris. The
distance measure is the shortest path along the railroad network and maritime linkages in kilometers.
The regression allows for different intercepts for each sector. Additionally, the regression controls for
the (log) employment share of sector s in province i in the national industry as a proxy for comparative
advantage, as well as the (log) employment share of the sector within the province as a proxy for local
labor market tightness.
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log(DistancetoParis) x log(ShareinProvince) 0.00569∗∗∗ (4.81) -0.0133∗∗∗ (-8.86)
Log(LMA) -0.0159 (-1.71) 0.0488∗∗∗ (4.13)
Constant 0.827∗∗∗ (11.55) -0.386∗∗∗ (-4.24)
Observations 657 657
F Stat 15.53 46.08
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table reports the results of the first stage for estimating the structural equation
1.4. The first stage predicts the endogenous variables log wis,1920wis,1914 , denoting (log) wage changes be-
tween 1920 and 1914 at the province-sector level, and log Lis,1920Lis,1914 , denoting employment changes
for the same time period at the province sector level. The first instrument is logdistancei,Paris ×
log(Employment Share of Sector in Province), where log(Employment Share of Sector in Province) ≡
Li,s,1914
∑r Li,r,1914
works as a labor supply shifter and is interacted with distance to Paris as a reduced form proxy
for differences in geographical advantages vis-a-vis the French destination market. A second instrument
is given by a Harris Market Potential measure for the input market leaving own size out as a labor supply












t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: This table reports the results from a regression of nominal income growth between 1920 and 1910









Alava 1.09 0.92 0.03 Agriculture 0.2576
Albacete 0.20 3.30 0.00 Books 0.0452
Alicante 0.64 1.62 0.00 Ceramics 0.0601
Almeria 0.88 0.89 0.01 Chemicals 0.3394
Avila 0.65 1.95 0.01 Construction 0.0770
Badajoz 0.71 2.07 0.00 Decoration 0.3176
Baleares 0.00 11.07 0.06 Electricity 0.0793
Barcelona 10.01 0.18 0.04 Food 0.2611
Burgos 1.25 1.36 0.01 Forrest 0.0852
Caceres 1.11 2.18 0.00 Furniture 0.3219
Cadiz 0.50 1.91 0.02 Garments 0.0642
Castellon 1.00 1.34 0.01 Glass 0.3366
Ciudad Real 1.18 2.31 0.00 Leather 0.6854
Cordoba 1.07 1.80 0.00 Metal Works 0.0001
Coruna 1.60 1.21 0.00 Metallurgy 0.1664
Cuenca 0.69 2.06 0.00 Mines 0.1801
Gerona 1.80 1.21 0.00 Paper 0.3458
Granada 0.33 2.88 0.00 Public 0.4204
Guadalajara 1.05 2.49 0.00 Public Industry 0.3710
Guipuzcoa 1.52 0.63 0.01 Textiles 0.0714
Huelva 0.88 1.51 0.00 Tobacco 0.0922
Huesca 1.56 1.01 0.00 Transport 0.1703
Jaen 1.09 1.41 0.00 Varias 0.5858
Leon 0.95 1.79 0.02 Wood 0.0000
Lerida 1.09 1.45 0.00
Logrono 1.03 1.02 0.01
Lugo 1.13 1.60 0.01 Elasticities and Constants
Madrid 5.57 0.36 0.04 ζ2 1.49
Malaga 0.86 1.77 0.00 ν 1.59
Murcia 0.93 0.95 0.00 γ 1.35
Navarra 1.22 1.45 0.02 log(ζcons) 1.40
Orense 0.70 2.42 0.03
Oviedo 0.79 2.06 0.02
Palencia 0.59 1.79 0.03
Pontevedra 1.63 1.21 0.02
Salamanca 0.82 1.96 0.01
Santander 0.83 0.75 0.02
Segovia 0.90 2.02 0.00
Sevilla 2.00 0.92 0.00
Soria 1.07 1.31 0.01
Tarragona 1.35 1.56 0.00
Teruel 1.04 1.31 0.01
Toledo 0.80 2.42 0.00
Valencia 0.95 1.75 0.00
Valladolid 0.98 1.31 0.03
Vizcaya 1.09 0.67 0.04
Zamora 0.64 2.18 0.01
Zaragoza 0.39 2.93 0.01
Notes: This table reports the results of the migration cost estimation. In the left column the amenity
shifters associated with the different provinces are reported. Barcelona is normalized to 1, with the
other provinces being expressed relatively to Barcelona. In the right column the sectoral switching cost
parameter µs is reported as well as the key elasticities pinning down spatial migration cost µij = ζcons ×
ζ1i × distance
ζ2
ij . The parameters are obtained via minimum distance estimation and the procedure is
described in detail in section ??. 57
1.11 Figures






















































































Notes: The figure depicts sectoral employment shares across the manufacturing sector/industry, agricul-
ture and services. The shares are observed in the census data in 1877, 1887, 1900 and 1910 where census
years are indicated by the red dotted line and the intervening years are imputed trend lines. Notice that
while service and industry employment is plotted against the left y-axis, agricultural employment is plot-
ted against right y-axis. The original computation of the aggregate employment share is due to Harrison
(1978).
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Notes: The map depicts total Manufacturing and Mining employment in the provinces in 1910 across Spain (without Canary Islands and North
African possessions). The map is a chloropleth with darker shaded colors depicting higher absolute numbers. The data is obtained from the
Population census from 1910.
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−8 −6 −4 −2 0
log(Employment Share of Sector in Province)
95% CI
Fitted values
Notes: The graph shows the fitted line of a regression correlating (nominal) income
growth at the sector province level between 1920 and 1914 with the log of the share of
that sector in the total employed population in that province in 1914. Specifically, the
variable on the x-axis is defined as log(Employment Share of Sector in Province) ≡
Li,s,1914
∑r Li,r,1914
. The data being used is the labor market panel introduced in the data
section.
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Notes: This figure reports the results of a regression correlating nominal income
growth between 1920 and 1910 at the sector province level with the (log) distance
from the provincial capital to Paris. The distance measure is the shortest path along
the railroad network and maritime linkages in kilometers.
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Notes: This figure reports the sectoral export growth for non belligerent destination countries - in blue - and belligerent destination countries in
grey. The product level trade has been aggregated to sector level trade data to match the level of aggregation of the labor market panel. Growth




correspondingly for non belligerent destinations. As discussed in section 1.5 I abstract from later years to avoid additional spatial frictions that
perturbed international trade, in particular increased maritime warfare. To adjust for additional spatial disruptions of the frontline the belligerent
countries are made up of France, Italy and the United Kingdom. The Non-belligerent countries exclude the United States and other later participants
of WWI. The shock is being calculated using the official annual trade data in constant prices.
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Notes: This figure shows the first stage regression predicting wage changes, wi,s,1920wi,s,1914 at the
province-sector level, using logdistancei,Paris × log(Employment Share of Sector in Province) as
an instrument, where log(Employment Share of Sector in Province) ≡ Li,s,1914
∑r Li,r,1914
works as a la-
bor supply shifter and is interacted with distance to Paris as a reduced form proxy for dif-
ferences in geographical advantages vis-a-vis the French destination market. Distance is cal-
culated using the shortest path along a network of railroads and maritime linkages between
province capitals in Spain and Paris in France. The figure depicts all industries. The data being
used is the labor market panel introduced in section 1.4.63
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Notes:This figure shows the first stage regression predicting changes in em-
ployment size, Li,s,1920Li,s,1914 at the province-sector level, using logdistancei,Paris ×
log(Employment Share of Sector in Province) as an instrument, where
log(Employment Share of Sector in Province) ≡ Li,s,1914
∑r Li,r,1914
works as a labor supply shifter
and is interacted with distance to Paris as a reduced form proxy for differences in geographical
advantages vis-a-vis the French destination market. Distance is calculated using the shortest
path along a network of railroads and maritime linkages between province capitals in Spain
and Paris in France. The figure depicts all industries. The data being used is the labor market
panel introduced in section 1.4.
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Notes: The upper graph depicts the aggregate sectoral employment for the observed data and the coun-
terfactual simulation of Spain in the absence of WWI. The values are constructed in the following way,
Ls ≡ ∑i Li,s,1920 where Li,s,1920 refers to the observed employment size in province i and sector s. Similarly




i,s,1920 is the simulated counterfactual sectoral employ-
ment size using the estimated model as described in section 1.8. The lower graph shows the same figure
in terms of difference between the counterfactual and observed data.
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Notes: The figure depicts the change in aggregate provincial employment for the observed data and the
counterfactual simulation of Spain in the absence of WWI. The values are constructed in the following
way, Ls ≡ ∑s Li,s,1920 where Li,s,1920 refers to the observed employment size in province i and sector s.




i,s,1920 is the simulated counterfactual sectoral
employment size using the estimated model as described in section 1.8. Relative changes are indicated
and calculated using those variables
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Figure 1.15: Counterfactual: Manufacturing Employment (1920)
-17000 -12000 -7000 -2000 3000 8000 13000

















































Change Observed vs Counterfactual (%)
Change Observed vs Counterfactual (level)
Notes: The figure depicts the change in manufacturing employment aggregated at the provincial level
between the observed data and the counterfactual simulation of Spain in the absence of WWI. The values
are constructed in the following way, Ls ≡ ∑s Li,s,1920 where Li,s,1920 refers to the observed employment





simulated counterfactual sectoral employment size using the estimated model as described in section 1.8.
Absolute and relative changes are indicated and calculated using those variables. The upper axis gives
the relevant scale for absolute changes, while the lower axis gives the relevant scale for relative changes.
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Notes: The map depicts the provincial differences in nominal income in the observed data compared to the counterfactual without the war shock. The
values for each province is calculated by first computing the nominal wages at the province level, that is Yi,1920 = ∑r wi,r,1920Li,r,1920 and sbustracting







• Censo de la población de España según el empadronamiento hecho en la península e islas
adyacentes el 31 de diciembre de 1910 (Instituto Geográfico; 1912)
– This publication contains population data disaggregated by profession for
each province of Spain in 1910.
• Censo de la población de España según el empadronamiento hecho en la península e islas
adyacentes el 31 de diciembre de 1920 (Instituto Geográfico; 1922)
– This publication contains population data disaggregated by profession for
each province of Spain in 1920.
– Furthermore, it also contains data on the origin of residents in each province
that were born in another province.
• Censo de la población de España según el empadronamiento hecho en la península e islas
adyacentes el 31 de diciembre de 1930 (Instituto Geográfico; 1932)
– This publication contains population data disaggregated by profession for
each province of Spain in 1930.
– Furthermore, it also contains data on the origin of residents in each province
that were born in another province.
• Estadística general del comercio exterior de España con sus posesiones de ultramar y po-
tencias extranjeras (de Aduanas; 1910-1930)
– This publication contains trade records decomposed along destination coun-
tries and product type.
• Estadistica de salarios y jornadas de trabajo referida al periodo 1914-1925 (Ministerio de
Trabajo; 1927)
– This publication contains wage and quantity data by profession between for
1914, 1920 and 1925
• Clasificación general de industrias, oficios y comercios 1931 (Instituto Nacional de Pre-
vision Social; 1930)




1.13.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let J be the number of alternatives. Depending on the values of the vector ǫ = {ǫ1, . . . , ǫJ}
the function maxi(δi × ǫi) takes on different values. First, examine the case where
maxi(δi × ǫi) = δ1 × ǫ1. That is, we will integrate δ1 × ǫ1 over the set M1 ≡ {ǫ : δ1 × ǫ1 >
δj × ǫj, j 6= i}:
Eǫ∈M1[max
i
(δi × ǫi)] =
∫ 8
− 8




























































Now we apply the functional form of the Fréchet distribution, where the CDF is given
by F(x) = e−x
−x
, and the PDF is given by f (x) = ax−1−ae−x
−a











































































where the second step comes from collecting one of the exponentiated terms into the






make the substitution x = Diǫ
−a
i so that dx = −aǫ
−a−1
i Didǫi ⇒ −
dx
Di






. Note that as ǫi approaches infinite, x approaches 0, and as ǫi approaches










































































The Gamma function is defined as Γ(t) =
∫ 8
0 x
t−1e−xdx. This implies that the integral




































































Regional Diversity and the Geography
of Unemployment
François de Soyres and Simon Fuchs
2.1 Abstract
We introduce a new framework to evaluate the effects of regional diversification. We
observe that in the presence of mobility frictions workers are exposed to local shocks
and that in a multi-sectoral framework this induces a trade-off: Regions can specialize
in their comparative advantage industries, but at the same time such specialization in-
creases labor market risk due to sector specific shocks. If mobility costs are high, then
welfare effects from lack of diversification can be substantial. We measure the segmen-
tation of the French labor market and introduce a new spatial equilibrium model that
incorporates labor market frictions, unemployment, and mobility cost into an otherwise
standard multi-sector economic geography model. We employ the model to simulate
unemployment responses to sector specific shock and demonstrate the interaction be-
tween mobility frictions and matching frictions.
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2.2 Introduction
With the increasing importance of China and other emerging economies, developed
countries are facing more competition in international markets. High degrees of re-
gional specialization which prior might have been optimal, now might subject workers
and whole regions to the risk of individual sectors losing out in international markets,
inducing unemployment risk, and protracted local adjustments. At a regional level
these new development might shift the focus to an important trade-off: Either a region
specializes to exploit comparative advantage, scale economies and foreign market op-
portunities or a region diversifies its sectoral base to provide insurance against sector
specific shocks in the form of a more diversified labor market. This begs the question:
How to characterize, evaluate and quantify this trade-off in the data?
Our argument in this paper is that in order to evaluate this question labor mobility
and geography should be central. Consider the following hypothetical example: An
engineer is working in Toulouse for Airbus on engines for the narrowbody twin engine
aircraft A320 neo. Due to the surprisingly successful launch of the Comac C919 - a Chi-
nese aerospace manufacturer - Airbus begins to anticipate less orders and downsizes
its engineering team - the worker is being let go. If he is mobile he can easily move
away from Toulouse and find a job elsewhere. What matters here is the geography of
his occupation-specific job market. For example he might be able to find another job
at the Rolls-Royce plant in Dahlewitz, Germany to produce airplane engines there, but
this would require a costly - not just in monetary terms - distant reallocation. If he is
not mobile then he might have to look for other work locally and if furthermore Airbus
or Airbus suppliers are the only or largest employers for engineers in Toulouse then the
likelihood of finding employment as an engineer in Toulouse again might be low and
the worker might have to incur a wage cut by transitioning to a different occupation
where his human capital level is effectively lower. To make things worse, his likelihood
of finding employment might be worse if he is at the same time competing with other
- freshly unemployed - engineers from his team at Airbus. What matters for the wel-
fare of the worker is therefore the worker’s mobility, the geography of his alternative
job markets, the transition cost to other occupations and regions and the local alterna-
tives. What is needed is therefore a tractable model that takes these forces into account
and helps us to quantify the different magnitudes (unemployment probabilities across
geographically and occupationally distinct labor markets and mobility costs).
A second motivation for such a model is the observed persistent increase in spatial
variance of unemployment during the great recession both in France (see figure 2.1) and
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Notes: The graph indicates the national unemployment rate as well as the (spatial) variance of unemploy-
ment across departments between 2003-2015. The source of the data is INSEE.
in the US (Yagan; 2017): This is difficult to reconcile with economic geography models
that abstract from impediments to labor mobility, but is an important phenomenon with
potentially large welfare effects.
In this paper we introduce a new theoretical framework that builds on standard multi-
sectoral economic geography model, but adds an enriched descriptions of the labor
market to capture the forces described above. We introduce three particular features:
Firstly, we break the traditional symmetry where firms produce across sectors and labor
markets are segmented across sectors as well. Instead, firms produce across sectors and
hire workers across different occupationally segregated labor markets. This allows us
to characterize several things: (1) The heterogeneous workforce across sectors, (2) the
degree to which particular occupation-region specific labor markets depend on (undi-
versified) sectoral demand, (3) a meaningful mobility choice on the worker side between
occupation-region specific labor markets with heterogeneous demand conditions and (4)
mobility cost between different occupational labor markets (which potentially represent
human capital losses). This feature also allows us to incorporate in our strucutral model
mobility costs that we can estimate from rich micro-level French panel data.
Secondly, we introduce matching frictions. Sectors hire across occupation specific local
labor markets by posting vacancies and job seeking workers are being matched up sub-
ject to matching frictions as represented by a matching function. This induces search
cost on the firm site and therefore a wedge between the market clearing wage in the
absence of matching frictions and the employment cost of the worker, resulting in invol-
untary unemployment. The model is kept tractable by introducing non-persistent in the
matches, i.e. matches will be separated at the end of each period. While this limits the
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extent to which the model can be used to analyze the persistence of temporary shocks
(i.e. persistence of frictional unemployment) it increases the tractability substantially
and still allows us to employ the model to analyse transitions between steady states as
well as the interaction between labor mobility and frictional unemployment. Matching
frictions and the associated congestion effects in the local labor market can then capture
to what extent the size of the shock (and therefore the lack of diversification) might
matter.
Thirdly, we introduce imperfect labor mobility. Workers can choose to relocate between
occupation-region specific labor markets but relocation is subject to occupation specific
and geographical switching costs. As mentioned before, occupation specific switching
costs might be related to the loss of human capital, while geographical switching cost
might capture psychic, informational and monetary switching cost associated to relo-
cation between regions. The framework can be connected to switching costs estimated
using dynamic estimation techniques on rich panel data and can therefore provide a
connecting point between a macroeconomic structural framework and detailed micro-
level administrative data. We show how to extent the current approach of estimating
occupational switching costs to incorporate geographical switching costs as well. We
work towards using the estimated parameters in our simulations.
Finally it is worth noting that mobility costs interact with the matching friction: Higher
mobility costs means more locally unemployed workers given the size of a separation
shock and the congestion effect in the local labor market increases the unemployment
response and welfare cost, therefore the total welfare effects of a shock are determined
by the geography of its unemployment response.
The paper connects to three separate strands in the literature: Firstly, ever since the
fundamental contributions of Henderson (1974) and Fujita and Ogawa (1982) the eco-
nomic geography literature has had at its center what has been dubbed the ’fundamental
trade-off in spatial economics’ that is the trade off between agglomeration benefits from
increased city size compared to higher congestion costs which in tandem determine the
optimal city size. The current analysis introduces an additional dimension to be con-
sidered that is the degree of sectoral diversification at the city or region level and the
implied unemployment risk of higher specialization.
Secondly, there is also an ongoing discussion on how to define and quantify economic
resilience (cp. for example Martin and Sunley (2015)). We provide a framework to eval-
uate economic resilience using the latest generation of quantative economic geography
models and utilizing a large array of micro-level data.
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Size of 2 Largest Industry
Notes: The two maps indicate the specialization patterns across French departments. On the left hand side
the chloropleth for the size of the largest industry is presented and on the right hand side the chloropleth
for the two largest industries. The measure is calculated based on an imputed measure of human capital
or effective labor units introduced later in this text. The source data is DADS.
Finally, the literature on international trade is increasingly moving away from making
ad-hoc assumptions on labor mobility and instead moves towards measuring mobility
costs more precisely. Our work is aiming towards closing the gap between improved
estimation of labor market segmentation and quantitative models that can be used to
understand the aggregate effects of local or external shocks. This type of work was
recently survey by McLaren (2017). In comparison to the literature we offer the first
endeavour to measure joint occupational, spatial and sectoral mobility costs and in-
corporate them into a rich quantative economic geography framework. Additionally,
we are amongst the first to explicitly incorporate multiple sectors, unemployment and
segregated labor markets into a unified framework.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives a simple illustration of the argument for
sectoral diversification. Section 3 measures introduces our technique for measuring oc-
cupational and geographical switching costs on French administrative data, effectively
measuring the labor market segmentation in France. Section 4 introduces the theoretical
framework as well as the calibration and simulation. Section 5 concludes.
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Figure 2.3: Optimal Sector Size (Constant
MP)
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Figure 2.4: Optimal Sector Size (Inc MP)
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Notes: The two graphs depict the Social Planner’s trade-off: Increasing the relative size of sector (via
relocating workers from Eb to Ea) imposes an increasing marginal cost (due to the congestion externality
in the labor market) while providing constant marginal benefits in the Ricardian example (left graph) and
increasing marginal benefits in an example where sector-level scale economies are present (right graph).
2.3 Insurance from Diversification: Simple Illustration
Consider a simple economy with two sectors a and b. Each sector uses currently em-
ployed labor, ea, to produce a final consumption good using the production function,
fa(·), which is assumed to be increasing and weakly convex. Workers are either initially
employed by a sector or unemployed in a sector specific labor market. The stock of
unemployed workers in sector a and b are given by ua or ub respectively and they ulti-
mately become job seekers denoted as xa and xb respectively. The economy is subject to
sector specific shocks. Each sector has a probability of 12 to be hit by a shock and if so
loses a proportion δ of their employed workforce. Workers who due to the shock lose
their employment join the stock of unemployed to become job seekers in their attached
sector. We denote the stock of job seekers in the shocked scenario as x̂a = ua + δea and
x̂b = ub + δeb. A matching function is taking the stock of job seekers as an input and
generates new matches as an output, i.e. ni = g(xi) where g(·) is assumed to be concave
and increasing in xi. This results in a new stock of employment e ′i = ei + ni which is
used to produce the consumption good. The timing is as follows: First, the separation
shock hits the economy, then the matches are being generates and finally based on e ′i
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there will be sector specific production. There is no inter-sectoral mobility.
Now consider a social planner who given the initial employment and unemployment
stock in sector a and b, aims to reallocate workers from sectoral employment in a to
sectoral employment in b before the separation shock is being realized in order to max-
imize expected welfare. That is he chooses l to change adjust ea = ēa − l and eb = ēb + l.
In such a setting the following can be show:
Proposition 2. The Social Planner faces a trade-off between allocative efficiency and welfare
losses due to higher (expected) unemployment.
The intuition of the result is simple: The Social Planner balances the allocative efficiency
with the insurance provided from higher diversification of the sectoral base. The crucial
assumption is that there is some concavity in the matching function such that a shock to
the larger sector perturbs the local labor market to a larger extent thus creating higher
welfare costs.
Finally, while the current example features the extreme case of immobile workers, the
degree to which a worker in a given sector will be affected by an adverse shock depends
crucially on his mobility: If the worker can easily move towards sectors and areas of the
economy that are unaffected then she can easily escape unemployment and as a side
effect of her move the local labor market will be less congested. This crucially depends
on the empirical segmentation of labor markets, that is to what extent workers can move
between potentially differently affected local sectoral labor markets. The next section
seeks to quantify the mobility cost across occupations and space in France.
2.4 French Labor Market Segmentation
As a first step we examine the mobility cost and thus segmentation between occupation-
department specific labor markets in France. This section introduces the French data as
well as our estimation strategy to estimate mobility costs between geographically and
occupationally separated labor markets.
2.4.1 Data
To analyse and quantify the segmentation of the French labor market, we use data
from the Declarations Annuelles des Donnees Sociales (DADS). In this data the French
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state makes available mandatory employer reports of the earnings for each employee
in the private sector. The universe of workers subject to the payroll tax are available
in the cross-section. However, in order to estimate mobility costs a panel is necessary.
The panel data version includes since 2002 all individuals born in October, i.e. 8.3 pc
subsample of the working population. For each employee the duration of a job along
with the wage is recorded. Furthermore some demographics are available such as sex
and age as well as a geographical notion of residence and work (up to community level
that is 36.000 units in France, however we are currently using departements). The job
is furthermore described in terms of an occupation codes (PCS). Finally, firm identifiers
allow us to match the worker level observations with firm level datasets on balance
sheets and recorded exports.
For our current estimation we focus on only five occupation classes defined at the PCS1
level which correspond to white collar workers (PCS1 category 3), intermediate profes-
sions/technicians (PCS1 category 4), employees (PCS1 category 5), blue collar workers
(PCS1 category 6), and other artisanal workers and self-employed (PCS1 category 2).
Furthermore, we focus on continental departments (95 overall). Firms are identified by
sectors according to the APE which corresponds roughly to the NAF where we charac-
terize firms at the 2 digit level which gives roughly 100 different sectors.
2.4.2 Model
The model is based on recent contributions by Traiberman (2017) and Scott (2014) and
formulates a worker’s dynamic problem of chosing a sequence of labor markets where
mobility is costly and therefore imperfect. We follow Traiberman (2017) in adopting
techniques along the lines of Hotz and Miller (1993) to remedy concerns about un-
observable continuation values. While our approach extends his by incorporating geo-
graphical mobility cost1 the exposition here follows his closely and the reader is referred
to his paper for more detail.
Workers, indexed by i, are characterized by a vector of observable demographics and
unobservable occupation specific comparative advantages, denoted by ω. They are ini-
tially located in a region-occupation specific labor market (n, o) and can choose to reallo-
cate subject to switching costs τot−1,otnt−1,nt . Let vt(o, n, ω, ǫ) by the value function of a worker
with demographics ω, previous occupation o, previous location n, vector of switching
1Though our approach is at the same time more limited since we do not yet present results adapting
the EM algorithm to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
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cost shock ǫ and define the integrated value function as Vt(o, n, ω) =
∫
vt(o, n, ω, ǫ)dG(ǫ).
The worker’s problem can the be written in recursive form:
(2.1)vt(o, n, ωit, ǫit) = max
o ′ ,n ′
(
wo ′ ,n ′ ,tEHo ′ ,n ′(ωit) + ηo ′ ,n ′ + ρǫo ′ ,n ′ ,i,t − τ
o,o ′
n,n ′
+ βEtVt+1(o ′, n ′, T(ωit, o
′, n ′))
)
where o, o ′ denotes the current and future occupation of the worker, n, n ′ denotes the
current and future region, wo,n is the occupation-region specific wage that is being paid
per unit of human capital which is measured by Ho,n(ωit) and depends on the worker’s
type at the time, ωit, ǫo ′ ,n ′ ,i,t is the preference shock and τ
ot−1,ot
nt−1,nt the mobility cost. The
last term denotes the continuation value which in turn depends on the chosen region-
occupation labor market and the transition of the worker’s characteristics. We assume










3 × tenit + θoi + σoςiot
Switching costs are a function of occupational bilateral switching cost and distance,
τ
ot−1,ot
nt−1,nt = δot ,ot−1 + δgeo + ̺ log(distnt ,nt−1)
To emphasise the connection to the full class of multinomial choice models we can
define the auxiliary function, ṽt(o, n, o ′, n ′, ω), such that,
(2.2)vt(oi,t−1, ni,t−1, ωit, ǫit) = max
o ′ ,n ′∈O×N
ṽt(o, n, o ′, n ′, ω) + ρǫo ′ ,n ′ ,i,t
Assuming GEV distributed cost shocks we obtain closed form transition probabili-
ties,
π(o ′, n ′|o, n, ω) =
exp(ṽt(o, n, o ′, n ′, ω)/ρ)
∑o ′′ ,n ′′ exp(ṽt(o, n, o ′′, n ′′, ω)/ρ)
2.4.3 Estimation Strategy
The challenge in estimating mobility costs is twofold. Firstly, dynamic problems can
be computationally burdensome if the estimation strategy requires solving the dynamic
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program. Secondly, unobservable heterogeneity might induce bias: In the case of imper-
fect labor mobility and switching costs between labor markets, there is an option value
of being attached to a specific labor market creating unobserved continuation values that
can induce omitted variable bias if not controlled for. To remedy this problem Hotz and
Miller (1993) and Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) introduced techniques that are based
on the properties of the GEV distribution to remove the unobservable continuation or
option values and allow us to obtain non-linear estimating equations that do not require
solving the complete DP. In the following we will give a short description.
We first collect moving costs and incomes into a flow payoff denoted by ut(o, n, o ′, n ′, ω)
and define the inclusive value as
Dt(ω, o, n) = ∑
o,n∈O×N
exp[ut(o, n, o ′, n ′, ω) + βEtVt+1(T(ω, o, n, o ′, n ′), o ′, n ′)
The probability of observing a career path from time t to τ can then be written as a dis-
counted sum of flow payoffs, discounted sum of worker’s expectation error and the cin-













+ βτ+1EτVτ+1(ωτ+1, oτ , nτ) − log Dt(ωs, os−1, ns−1)
(2.3)
where ζs refers to expectation errors. What is important to note is that if we assume
renewal action (a special case of finite dependence) that is that past occupational choices
do not affect your flow payoff in future occupational choices except through changes in
your worker level demographics, then we can compare worker career trajectories with
identical starting and end positions and the unobservable terms cancel out. Specifically,






πs(ωis, oi,s−1, ni,s−1, oi,s, ni,s)










βs−t[ζi,s − ζ j,s] + β
τ+1Eτ(Vτ+1(ωi,τ+1, oi,τ , ni,τ) − Vτ+1(ωj,τ+1, oj,τ , nj,τ))
− [log Dt(ωi,s, oi,s−1, ni,s−1) − Dt(ωj,s, oj,s−1, nj,s−1)]
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If workers have same initial inclusive values and same terminal continuation values then
the unobservable terms disappear. The left hand side can be estimated directly from
data, and the right hand side is a nonlinear function of observables with an additive
error term.
2.4.4 Estimation
For the estimation we follow Traiberman (2017) and focus on one shot deviations, i.e.
career trajectories that diverge for one period both along the occupation and geography
margin, but then converge again to the same occupation-region labor market. Mathe-
matically, we estimate the following equation:
log
πt(ω, o, n, o ′, n ′)
πt(ω, o, n, o, n)
+ β log
πt(ω ′, o ′, n ′, o ′′, n ′′)




o ′ ,o ′′







(wo ′ ,n ′−wo,n)+
1
ρ
(ηn ′o ′−ηno)+ζo,n,t +mo,o ′ ,o ′′ ,n,n ′ ,n ′′ ,t
(2.5)
Since there are too many combinations that can be used and computed2 we instead focus
on geographical trajectories that end in departements that form the Parisian region (Île-
de-France). This gives us more than six million observations.
In order to construct the left hand side, we obtain the conditional choice probabilities
by forming bins by age groups, distance to destination and sex. We exploit the fact that
once we introduce a occupation-region(-time) specific fixed effect that controls for dif-
ferent choice sets across labor markets, the probability of choosing one location rather
than another is merely a function of the bilateral distance and the labor market’s attrac-
tiveness, i.e. real wage, of a location.
2.4.5 Results
Preliminary results with regard to the occupational mobility costs are presented in fig-
ure 2.6. Occupational mobility costs can be as high as 60 percent of the yearly income
of a worker and severely limit occupational mobility. Spatial mobility cost is still work
in progress.
2Note, that compared to Traiberman (2017) the number of possible combinations is even larger since
we introduce the additional geographic dimension.
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2.5 Quantitative Analysis: Optimal Diversification
In this section we first introduce the theoretical framework before we illustrate its cali-
bration and finally its workings via simulation.
2.5.1 Theoretical Framework
Consider an economy with multiple locations indexed by n, i ∈ N . Locations are hetero-
geneous in their exogenously fixed housing supply, Hn, and their geographical location
relative to one another. Each location produces goods in multiple sectors s ∈ S . Total
population at time t is exogenously fixed at Lt. Firms hire workers from different oc-
cupations, o ∈ O, and there is an initial distribution at time 0 of the population across
locations and occupations, [Li,o,0]∀i,o. For the exposition of the static equilibrium we
drop the time subscripts. We will reintroduce them later on when we introduce the
dynamic adjustment via worker mobility.
Preferences and Endowments
Workers belong to a labor market (n, o) which is location-occupation specific. In a given
labor market (n, o), workers can be either unemployed or employed with a process
described below. Each worker is endowed with preferences for consumption of goods
from different sectors and residential land use. The flow utility of worker i in labor








with Cn,oj (i) the consumption of industry j-good by a worker i in labor market (n, o).
This consumption does not take the same value if the worker is unemployed of em-
ployed. The sectoral goods consumption index is defined over consumption of a fixed











where the CES parameter ρ captures the elasticity of substitution between goods defined









where In,o is the revenue of the representative consumer in labor market (n, o) and the






The indirect flow utility that worker i obtains at time t from living in labor market (n, s)













where µn,s represents the Cobb Douglas multiplier 3 and vn,o(i) is the income of worker
i in labor market (n, o). The income of the worker depends on its status, that is if she is
employed or unemployed,
If i is employed ven,o = wn,o (2.9)
If i is unemployed vun,o = bn,o (2.10)
With wn,o the wage, bn,o is the unemployment benefit which is locally financed via
proportional taxation and vn,o the average income of workers in labor market (n, s).






















Within each location n, each sector s is endowed with an exogenous baseline productiv-
ity level An,s,t. Firms employ a constant returns to scale production function,
Qn,s(k) = zn,s(k)An,s × Ẽn,s(k) (2.12)
where An,s,t is the implied sector wide productivity and where Ẽn,s is a Cobb-Douglas






Each variety k is also associated with an idiosyncratic productivity, zn,s(k), which is
drawn from a Frechet distribution as in Eaton and Kortum (2002),
Prob(z ≤ Z) = e−Z
−θs
where θs determines the variance of productivities being drawn and therefore pins down
the trade elasticity. We will see that only a subset Xn,s ⊂ [0, 1] is actually produced in
location n in every industry s.
Labor Market
Labor markets are segmented across occupations and space and can be denoted by the
tuple (n, o). Each labor market (n, o) is characterized by matching frictions. An infinitely
elastic supply of potential firms may enter the labor market by opening vacancies. At the
beginning of any period, all workers are unmatched and are looking for a job. Matches







where Γn,o is a measure of the aggregate efficiency of the matching technology in labor
market (n, o). Furthermore, several sectors might post vacancies in the same occupation
specific labor market implying that aggregate posted vacancies in market labor market
(n, o) is the sum of vacancies posted by firms in individual sectors searching in that labor
market, i.e. Vn,o = ∑s Vn,o,s. The number of matches specific to sector s is proportional












where we define the labor market tightness in labor market (n, o) as λn,o = Vn,o/Ln,o.
As in Helpman and Itskhoki (2010, 2014) matching frictions lead to a non trivial hiring
cost for firms as well as matching rents over which firms and workers bargained, as
explained below.
Proposition 3. The cost of hiring one worker for a firm in sector s and in labor market (n, o) is:
κn,o,s = ω−1n,o,san,oλ
χ











The expected cost of filling a vacancy posted by sector s in labor market (n, o) is the cost
of posting the vacancy multiplied by the vacancy filling rate and the probability that the













is the probability that the filled vacancy belongs to sector s. Noting
an,o = csΓn,o , one has the result.
Similarly, we can calculate the cost of finding a unit of the composite worker, Ẽn,s,t.












Proof. Define as xo(w, k, 1) the factor demand to obtain one composite unit of labor
given the vector of wages and hiring costs as defined above. The cost of hiring one
composite unit can be written as the sum of the conditional demand multiplied by the



















× Cn,s(w, k), where Cn,s(w, k)4 refers to the unit cost function and is com-
mon to the conditional demand functions for all factors and can thus be factored out
obtaining the result in the proposition.

































































Note that the cost of vacancy filling is increasing in vacancies posted. This comes from
the concavity of the matching function with regard to vacancies posted and mirrors a
localized congestion effect in the labor market.
Prices and Wages
Since firms need to participate in the labor market by posting vacancies in order to hire
the marginal cost of a worker is equal to the market wage plus the vacancy posting cost.
This introduces a wedge into the local labor market which in turn induces rationing as
mitigated via the matching function. The firm takes that into account when making its
decisions. The production function is linear in the composite of occupational labor and
there is perfect competition in the good market. This implies that the size of a firm is
irrelevant: the firm bargains with each worker independently.5 The revenue generated
by each unit of a composite worker, Ẽn,s(k), when producing variety k ∈ Xn,s is given
by
rn,s(k) = pn,s(k)zn,s(k)An,s













5This is the same as in Carrere, Grujovic and Robert-Nicoud (2015). If firms were monopolists within
their variety, they would take into account the demand curve and revenues would be concave with respect
to labor, as in Helpman and Itskhoki (2010, 2014). In such a case, one would have to use the Stole-Zwiebel
bargaining protocol.
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Assuming that firms and workers have equal bargaining shares, the composite wage
that producer of variety k is willing to pay is equal to:




Firms must pay a cost κ̃n,s to hire an additional unit of the composite worker, this cost is
exogenous to any individual firm k. Firms optimally choose to post vacancies until the
marginal revenue they derive from the worker (net of wage) is equal to the cost of hiring
her, κ̃n,s. Since firms and workers equally share the matching rent as stated above, this
then implies that the wage rate satisfies w̃n,s(k) = 2bn + κ̃n,s. A key consequence is that all
firms in industry s pay the same unit wage regardless of their productivity. Moreover,
with perfect competition firms price at their marginal cost so that the market price for








where ζni the iceberg cost when shipping from n to i and (w̃n,s + κ̃n,s) is the total cost
incurred by a firm when hiring a unit of the composite worker, accounting for the wage
and hiring cost. Finally we can also define the wage bill for hiring one unit of the
composite worker.












Proof. The proof follows the proof for proposition 3. Define as xo(w, k, 1) the factor
demand to obtain one composite unit of labor given the vector of wages and hiring
costs as defined above. The wage cost of employing one composite unit can be written




















× C(w, k), where C(w, k)6 refers to the unit cost function and is common to
the conditional demand functions for all factors and can thus be factored out obtaining
the result in the proposition.
Housing Market
We assume that there is a fixed expenditure share as housing as introduced above,
δ ≡ (1 − ∑j αj) > 0
7. Furthermore, we follow Monte et al. (2017) and assume that
the housing stock is owned locally by landlords who consume traded goods only. This
implies that total demand in a location is equal to total factor earnings.
Trade shares
Consumers buy any variety k from the location charging the cheapest price. Standard










representing the multilateral resistance term in location i and sector s, characterizing
how competitive the destination market is. The price index in location i is related to the
multilateral resistance term in the following way,
P−θsi,s = γ [Φi,s] (2.23)





θs − (σ − 1)
θs
)]













7In later empirical applications this will be calibrated to a value of .23 as in Combes et al. (2018)
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Note that location-sector-specific labor market conditions (described by κn,s) and location-
sector-specific technologies (described by An,s,t) have observationally identical effects on









where Q is a constant equal to the gamma function evaluated at 1 + (1 − σθs ). Before
introducing the static equilibrium, we make one last adjustment to the standard model
and introduce a (foreign) sector specific demand shifter, i.e. there exists a fixed exoge-
nous sector specific demand, ΞF,s,t, where exports to that destination e.g. from region i
in sector s are modelled as follows,
XFi,s,t = πi,F,s,t × ΞF,s,t
where ΞF,s,t is a stochastically evolving shock variable. Given the description of the
model we are now in a position to define the static equilibrium conditional on a worker
allocation.
To enhance clarity and elucidate the structure of the model we introduce the static equi-
librium in two steps: In a first step we introduce the conditions that define the trade
equilibrium conditional on sector-location (n, s) specific demand and composite wages.
In a second step we introduce the conditions that determine occupation specific vari-
ables. The first part of the static equilibrium is defined by the following equations,
Definition 2 (Static Equilibrium (Location- and Sector-level outcomes)). Given data on
labor allocations aggregated to the location-sector specific composite, [L̃n,s]∀n×s, stocks of loca-
tion specific unemployed workers, [Un]∀n, the housing stock, [H̄n]∀n, baseline productivities,
[An,s]∀n×s, values for the parameters [βo,s]∀o×s, [θs]∀s, [αs]∀s, [ΞF,s]∀s, [Γ̃n,s]∀n×s, [c̃s]∀s, [bn]∀n,
the static trade equilibrium is defined by a set of bilateral expenditure shares between regions
[πi,n,s]∀i×n×s, wages [w̃n,s]∀n×s, hiring costs [κ̃n,s]∀n×s, vacancies posted [Ṽn,s]∀n×s, and em-
ployment levels [Ẽn,s]∀n×s such that the following conditions are satisfied.
• For each industry-location (n, s), total income equals total factor expenditure,






+ XnF,s ∀(n, s) ∈ N × S (2.25)
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• where the share of total spending devoted to products produced in i in location n and sector




∀(i, n, s) ∈ N ×N × S (2.26)
with Φn,s defined by (2.22).







∀(n, s) ∈ N × S (2.27)
• Fixed expenditure share on foreign products such that trade is balanced.
• Recruitment cost and wages are related according to
w̃n,s = 2bn,s + κ̃n,s ∀(n, s) ∈ N × S (2.28)
• Total recruitment cost satisfies,
κ̃n,sẼn,s = c̃n,sṼn,s ∀(n, s) ∈ N × S (2.29)
• Sector location specific matching function




n,s ∀(n, s) ∈ N × S (2.30)




∀n ∈ N (2.31)
Definition 3 (Static equilibrium (Occupation-level outcomes)). If the static trade equilib-
rium is satisfied (that is data for [πi,n,s]∀i×n×s, wages [w̃n,s]∀n×s, hiring costs [κ̃n,s]∀n×s, va-
cancies posted [Ṽn,s]∀n×s, and employment levels [Ẽn,s]∀n×s are available) and the sector specific
variables are linked to the occupation specific variables as follows,























































and if furthermore data on location-occupation allocations, [Ln,o]∀n,o and vacancy postings
costs, [co]∀o, are available, then the static equilibrium is defined by occupation specific wages
[wn,o]∀n×o, hiring costs [κn,o]∀n×o, vacancies posted [Vn,o,s]∀n×o×s, and employment levels
[En,o,s]∀n×o×s such that the following conditions are satisfied.
• In each labor market (n, s), the recruiting cost satisfies
κn,o,s = ω−1n,o,san,oλ
χ
n,o ∀(n, o, s) ∈ O ×N × S (2.38)
where an,o = co/Γn,o, ωn,o,s ≡ Vn,o,s/∑s Vn,o,s





n,o ∀(n, o) ∈ N ×O (2.39)
• The level of sectoral employment for a specific occupation is given by
En,o,s = Vn,o,sΓn,oλ
−χ
n,o ∀(n, o) ∈ N ×O (2.40)
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• Each industry-location (n, s) is paying a fixed share of its income to each factor
(wn,o + κn,o,s)En,o,s = βo,s(w̃n,s + κ̃n,s)Ẽn,s ∀(n, o, s) ∈ N ×O × S (2.41)








• Total recruitment cost is equal to vacancy posting cost
κn,o,sEn,o,s = coVn,o,s
Dynamics
The previous section describes wages, unemployment, prices and trade conditional on
labor allocation. Between periods we allow labor to move between (o, n) labor markets
to arbitrage away indirect utility differences subject to mobility costs. This introduces
spatial dynamics where a negative demand shock that affects one region can spill over
into another region in the form of out migration. In order for the quantitative model to
generate realistic unemployment fluctuations we follow Chodorow-Reich and Wieland
(2017) and introduce ad-hoc downward nominal wage rigidity.
Labor Mobility The previous subsection builds the solution to the equilibrium given
the cross-sectional labor allocation. However, before the realization of external demand
in period t + 1, workers can choose to re-locate to a different labor market. We therefore
follow Kennan and Walker (2011) in characterising the worker’s decision as a dynamic
discrete choice between different occupation-location specific labor markets subject to
incurring a mobility cost. The worker is assumed to discount future periods, thus her









where V0,n0,o0(i) denotes the value function of individual i located in an initial labor
market (n, o) at time period 0 and who chooses a sequence of labor markets [nt, ot]∀t
over her lifetime, where τot−1,otnt−1,nt indicates the mobility cost which takes a positive value
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if either nt 6= nt−1 or ot 6= ot−1.
The worker’s dynamic discrete choice problem is to choose next periods location opti-
mally by comparing the expected value of each location net the mobility cost of moving
there. Since workers are risk neutral and the current employment status has no impact
on the mobility decisions8, we can write the problem as if there is perfect risk sharing
between all workers in each (n, o) market. Noting the current cross-sectional labor al-
location as Lt = {Ln,o,t}n∈N ,o∈O and the current realization of external demand shocks
as Ξt = {Ξs,t}s∈S , the state of the world is defined by Ωt = {Lt, Ξt}. The problem
writes:
Vn,o(Ωt) = U(vn,o(Ωt)) + max
n ′ ,o ′
[
βEtVn ′ ,o ′(Ωt+1) − τ
o,o ′
n,n ′ + νǫ
n ′ ,o ′
t
]
where vn,o,t is the average income in labor market (n, o) defined by the static equilibrium
for a state Ωt. As is common in the dynamic discrete choice literature as well as in the
labor mobility literature, we can follow McFadden (1977) and assume that the prefer-
ence shocks are extreme value distributed and iid distributed, such that
Assumption 2 (McFadden 1977). Idiosyncratic location-occupation specific preference shifter,
ǫn
′ ,o ′
t is iid EV 1 distributed with dispersion parameter ν.
This gives us the law of motion for labor,





where µ(i,j)→(n,s) is the implied transition rate, that is the share of workers from (i, j) to

























where the value functions can be written exploiting McFadden’s aggregation result,
Vn,o(Ωt) = U(vn,o(Ωt)) + ν log
[
∑












8Recall that matches last only one period.
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Nominal Downward Wage ridigity Wages are being determined competitively in the
labor market but are dynamically subject to nominal wage ridigities in the spirit of
Chodorow-Reich and Wieland (2017):
wn,o,t = max
{
w∗n,o,t, (1 − χ)wn,o,t−1
}
(2.45)
where w∗n,o,t is the wage determined by the static equilibrium.
Steady State Finally we are in a position to define the steady state of the economy.
Definition 4 (Steady State). A steady state solves the static equilibrium, imposes that the
spatial labor allocation and frictional unemployment has converged. The steady state is defined
as a vector of labor allocations [L̄n,o]∀n∈N ,o∈O such that the following conditions are satisfied,
• Spatial labor allocation has converged such that,




n,n ′ L̄n,o (2.46)
























• where Value functions solve the following equation
V̄n,o(Ω̄) = U(vn,o(Ωt)) + ν log
[
∑












• Downward wage rigidity is no longer binding, i.e. wn,o,t = w∗n,s,t
2.5.2 Calibration
This section states how to use the model structure and sufficient data to back out the
relevant parameters of the model. We first state the inversion result in general before
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giving an outline of the procedure of the calibration.
Proposition 6 (Calibration Static Equilibrium). Given data on [En,o,s]∀n,o,s9, [wn,o,s]∀n,o,s,
[XFn,s]∀n,s, [rn]∀n, [Ln,o]∀n,o, [ζni]∀ni, and calibrating the value of χ, [θs]∀s the model can be
inverted to obtain the parameters of the model, [βo,s]∀o,s,[αs]∀s, [An,s]∀n,s, [Γn,o]∀n,o.
The calibration proceeds in multiple steps which are detailed in the appendix. The
procedure can be summarized by highlighting the key steps: (1) Back out βo,s as sector-
occupation specific shares in the payroll of an industry.10 (2) We solve the labor market
clearing conditions for search costs and sector specific employment levels and wages. (3)
From observed employment levels and unmeployment levels we back out the matching
parameters either exploiting cross-sectional or time-series variation and assuming that
matching efficiency is constant across time or across a occupations or space. (4) We
finally use the static equilibrium and sector level employment, wages, search costs,
income and calibrations for the trade elasticity to back out the underlying productivity
of each sector-location.
2.5.3 Simulation Results
In this section we demonstrate simulation results to illustrate the mechanism of the
model, and in particular the interaction between labor market matching frictions and
mobility frictions. In order to do so we simulated a baseline economy with ten loca-
tions, three occupations and two sectors. The locations are randomly drawn from the
geographical extent of the France, i.e. bilateral distances are limited to bilateral distance
within France. We draw randomly sector-region-occupation employment numbers as
well as wages and rental rates. We furthermore calibrate the trade elasticity, the match-
ing function, the discount factor and housing expenditure share. Foreign demand is
calibrated to 80 percent of the sector-location specific payroll.
The simulation shocks a sector-location by decreasing the foreign demand in period 2
only and solves then for the dynamic counterfactual. The figure 2.5 demonstrates the
global/national unemployment rate under three scenarios: No labor mobility across
occupations and geography, perfect mobility and imperfect labor mobility.11
9The stock of employment can be computed by calculating the efficiency unit of labor equivalent for
each worker as a multiple of a baseline wage the Mincer regression
10Notice that this is an appropriate estimator if and only if hiring costs are orthogonal to wages across
locations.
11Imperfect labor mobility allows for some geographical mobility, but no occupational mobility.
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Figure 2.5: Simulation: Unemployment Perfect vs Imperfect Mobility
Notes: Simulation results for three different scenarios: No mobility, perfect mobility and imperfect mo-
bility. There is a temporary shock in the second period (a negative shock to a random location-sector
specific foreign demand variable). Adjustment follows in the same period and thereafter. The first period
is the steady state unemployment rate.
Under no labor mobility and perfect labor mobility the unemployment rate increases for
1 period and then reverts back to the steady state. In the current model, because of the
limited duration of filled vacancies, there is no persistence of temporary demand shocks
in those extreme cases. As demand returns either the workers return immediately (per-
fect mobility) or they will never have left their occupation-region specific labor market
(no mobility). In either case the initial equilibrium can be directly reobtained. Notice
however, that the peak unemployment due to the shock is higher in the no mobility case.
This is because in the perfect mobility scenario workers can seek employment elsewhere
and the impact of the shock and local congestion of the labor market is alleviated. In
the no mobility scenario this cannot be achieved, thus higher national unemployment
is the result. Intuitively, the mobility cost determines to what extent the factors can be
re-allocated in an efficient manner as a response to the shock.
The imperfect mobility case indicates (slightly) persistent unemployment responses:
The initial shock disperses workers into other labor markets. The initial unemploy-
ment response is below no mobility scenario. However, the return to the initial steady




In this paper we introduce a tractable framework that extends standard economic ge-
ography models to include a quantitative and realistic description of the labor market
that can - amongst other things - be easily connected to micro- and macro-level data.
We point towards a pathway to analyze both theoretically and empirically the costs and
benefits from regional diversification and thereby extend the fundamental trade-off in
spatial economics between scale economies and congestion by an additional dimension
- that of diversification. The framework can also be used to examine related questions
such as the optimal distribution of sectors between rather than within regions. Fu-
ture application will include the extensive evaluation of regional unemployment risk
in France as well as a comparison with the allocative efficiency motif presented in a
stylized fashion in section 2.
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2.6: Estimation: Occupational Mobility cost
Notes: The graph depicts the occupation mobility costs between occupation 1 to 5 (PCS1 code) to occupa-
tions 1 to 5. Darker/colder shaded colors indicate lower (additive) switching costs while lighter/warmer
shaded colors indicate higher switching costs. Diagonal switching costs are normalized to 0.
2.8 Theoretical Illustration: Details
• Two sectors a and b
• For each sector two states of the world - shocked states (outcomes denoted by x̂)
and non-shocked states (outcomes denoted by x) - shock separates a fixed share,
δ, of workers
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• Initial employment allocation given, ea, eb, as well as stock of unemployed workers,
ua, ub
• In each period unemployed (and freshly separated workers) search for a job, they
make up the stock of job searchers
xa = ua
xb = ub
x̂a = ua + δea
x̂b = ub + δeb
• Matching function takes job searchers as an input and produces employment (ab-





• Variables, e ′a, e
′
b, summarize the stocks of workers at the end of the period
e ′a = ea + na
e ′b = eb + nb
ê ′a = (1 − δ)ea + n̂a
ê ′b = (1 − δ)eb + n̂b
• Employed workers produce and consume their consumption, unemployed work-
ers receive fixed unemployment benefits z
Ca = f (ea)
Cb = f (eb)
Ĉa = f (êa)
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Ĉb = f (êb)
• Social Planner maximizes expected welfare by reallocating employed workers from
sector a to sector b, that is he chooses variable l such that,
ea = ēa − l










a + uaz + ê
′






• First order conditions imply that l must satisfy,
(































• Where the LHS signifies the allocative efficiency loss due to reallocating workers
from potentially higher productivity sectors to lower productivity sectors
• Where the RHS signifies gains associated with decreases in expected unemploy-
ment
2.9 Algorithm: Calibration
To describe the calibration in more detail we explain the individual steps of the code as
well as data and calibration requirements.
Code 1 (Calibration Static Equilibrium). The calibration obtains the parameters of the model,
[βo,s]∀o,s,[αs]∀s, [An,s]∀n,s, [Γn,o]∀n,o, using the following data as input, [En,o,s]∀n,o,s, [wn,o,s]∀n,o,s,
[XFn,s]∀n,s, [rn]∀n, [Ln,o]∀n,o, [ζni]∀ni, and calibrating the value of χ, [θs]∀s. The calibration pro-
ceeds as follows,
1. We back out βo,s as sector-occupation specific shares in the payroll of an industry:
βo,s =
∑n wn,o,sEn,o,s
∑n ′ ∑o ′ wn ′ ,o ′ ,sEn ′ ,o ′ ,s
This is an appropriate estimator if and only if hiring costs are orthogonal to wages across
locations.
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• Data Required: [En,o,s]∀n,o,s, [wn,o,s]∀n,o,s
• Calibration Required: None.
• Data obtained: [βo,s]∀o,s
2. Solve occupation-province labor market clearing for κn,o,s (N × O × S equations)
(wn,o + κn,o,s)En,o,s = βo,s(w̃n,s + κ̃n,s)Ẽn,s




































• Data Required: [En,o,s]∀n,o,s, [wn,o]∀n,o12, [βo,s]∀o,s
• Calibration Required: None.
• Data obtained: [κn,o,s]∀n,o,s, [Ẽn,s]∀n,s, [κ̃n,s]∀n,s, [w̃n,s]∀n,s
3. We back out αs as nation-wide share of industry s in total revenue,
αs =
∑n(w̃n,s + κ̃n,s)Ẽn,s − Xn,s
∑n,s(w̃n,s + κ̃n,s)Ẽn,s − Xn,s
• Data Required: [Ẽn,s]∀n,s, [κ̃n,s]∀n,s, [w̃n,s]∀n,s
• Calibration Required: None.
• Data obtained: [αs]∀s




12Notice that while in the data wn,o,s are available the model only allows for wages that are heteroge-



























where X̄ ≡ ∑n,s X
F
n,s and Ȳ ≡ ∑n Yn
• Data Required: wn,o, En,o,s, βo,s, rn
• Calibration Required: δ = 0.23 following Combes et al. (2018) which in turn relies
on the French ministry that oversees housing (CGDD; 2011)
• Data obtained: [Hn]∀n













Obtain Γn via fixed effects. Finally, back out Vn,o conditional on calibrating χ
• Data Required: [En,o]∀n,o, [Ln,o]∀n,o
• Calibration Required: χ
• Data obtained: [Γn]∀n, [Vn,o]∀n,o




















• Data Required: [En,o,s]∀n,o,s, [En,o]∀n,o, [Vn,o]∀n,o, [κn,o,s]∀n,o
• Calibration Required: None
• Data obtained: [cn,o,s]∀n,o,s, [Vn,o,s]∀n,o,s

















• Data Required: [Ẽn,s]∀n,s, [κ̃n,s]∀n,s, [w̃n,s]∀n,s, [Vn,o,s]∀n,o,s
• Calibration Required: None
• Data obtained: [Ṽn,s]∀n,s, [bn,s]∀n,s, [c̃n,s]∀n,s
8. We estimate productivity [An,s]∀n,s∈N×S from Market clearing condition where Total Rev-
enue is taken from Balance sheet data.










• Data Required: [Ẽn,s]∀n,s, [κ̃n,s]∀n,s, [w̃n,s]∀n,s, [XFn,s]∀n,s, [αs]∀s, [Yn]∀n, [ζni]∀ni
• Calibration Required: [θs]∀s
• Data obtained: [An,s]∀n,s
9. Back out λn,o defined as
wn,o ∑
s
En,o,s = λn,o ∑
s
βo,s(w̃n,s + κ̃n,s)Ẽn,s
• Data Required: [βo,s]∀o,s,[wn,o]∀n,o,[En,o,s]∀n,o,s,[Ẽn,s]∀n,s, [κ̃n,s]∀n,s, [w̃n,s]∀n,s,
• Calibration Required: None.
• Data obtained: [λn,o]∀n,o
Code 2 (Calibration Steady State). The calibration obtains the remaining parameters of the
migration module, that is the amenity values, [̺n,o]∀n,o, given the estimated switching costs and
the data from the static equilibrium.
• Use transition equation for steady state and pick amenities such that given the observed
allocation of labor the following equations are satisfied,



























V̄n,o(Ω̄) = U(vn,o(Ω̄)) + ν log
[
∑













2.10 Algorithm: Counterfactual Static Equilibrium
Algorithm 1 (Solving for the counterfactual static Equilibrium). Conditional on labor al-
locations and foreign demand the new equilibrium can be calculated in two steps. First by cal-
culating sector-level outcomes and then by calculating occupation level outcomes. The algorithm
implements the following steps:
1. Static Equilibrium (sector-level outcomes)
(a) Notice that the static equilibrium can be expressed in terms of Ṽn,s as unknown
variables only which we can solve for from,
































• Data Required: [bn,s], [c̃n,s], [Ln,o]∀n,o, [αs]∀s, [βo,s]∀o,s, [Γn]∀n
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• Calibration Required: χ, [θs]∀s
• Data obtained: [Ṽn,s]∀n,s, [Ẽn,s]∀n,s, [κ̃n,s]∀n,s, [L̃n,s]∀n,s, [w̃n,s]∀n,s, [Yn]∀n
• Important Note: [Ṽn,s]∀n,s can only be identified in relative terms, i.e. vis-a-vis













• Data Required: [Yn]∀n, [Hn]∀n
• Calibration Required: δ
• Data obtained: [rn]∀n
2. Static equilibrium (occupation-level outcomes)
(a) Use Labor Market clearing equation at the sector and occupation-region level and
substitute out κ and employment levels to get an equation in Vn,o,s and wn,o only -
solve for Vn,o,s and wn,o
(wn,o + κn,o,s)En,o,s = βo,s(w̃n,s + κ̃n,s)Ẽn,s
wn,o ∑
s



















• Data Required: [w̃n,s]∀n,s, [κ̃n,s]∀n,s, [Ẽn,s]∀n,s, [Ln,o]∀n,o
• Calibration Required: χ
• Data obtained: [Vn,o,s]∀n,o,s, [wn,o]∀n,o, [Enos]∀n,o,s, [κn,o,s]∀n,o,s
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2.11 Algorithm: Counterfactual Dynamics and Steady State
Algorithm 2 (Solving for Dynamics/Steady State). We solve for the counterfactual dynamics
in the following way,
1. Guess initial sequence of cross sectional wages [wn,o,t]∀n,o,t, rental rates and unemploy-
ment probabilities
2. Solve value functions
3. Calculate implied labor flows and implied labor stocks [Ln,o,t]
4. Calculate static equilibrium and update wages, rental rates and unemployment probabili-
ties
5. Go back to step [1]. Repeat until convergence.
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Chapter 3
Globalization and Taste Heterogeneity:
Evidence from Hollywood
Konrad Adler and Simon Fuchs
3.1 Abstract
To what extent is the set of products that are available to a country driven by the compo-
sition of international markets? We develop a quantitative framework to determine and
map the similarity between countries from observed market shares of identical products
across markets. We apply our framework to the global movies market where we can
abstract from price competition and observe identical products and their market shares
across countries. As an application we evaluate the hypothesis that the observed large
increase in the revenue share of sequels has been due to shifts in the composition of
global demand away from traditional western markets inducing demand risk and with
sequels providing insurance. While we find substantial shifts in the profit space and
lower risk associated with sequels, our simulations suggest that the risk due to taste
heterogeneity in the movies market is quantitatively insufficient to explain the increase




2015 was a successful year for Hollywood, with the global box office increasing to 38.3
billion dollars (MPAA 2015) and with the top performing American productions captur-
ing the largest part of the revenue. Creativity, however, seems to have reached low-point:
Amongst the top 10 highest performing movies1 only one movie can be categorized as
original work with no preceding media products. Among the rest we find six franchises
(James Bond, Hunger Games, Star Wars, Jurassic Park, Avengers/Marvel, Fast and Fu-
rious), a book adaptation (The Martian), and a remake (Cinderella). In 2015 sequels or
franchises made up almost 60 percent of the yearly revenue up from around 30 percent
at the beginning of the 2000s. Simultaneously, the composition of the global movie mar-
ket has shifted dramatically with the US and Western European markets becoming less
important compared to Asia, Eastern Europe and other markets. To what extent and
how did these demand shifts influence creativity and the product mix in Hollywood?
More generally, how does the composition of global markets with countries affect the
product mix?
Traditional trade theory has often abstracted from this question because a measure of
taste heterogeneity across countries is needed to provide an answer and this has been
difficult to estimate.2 Yet global market integration and the increasing importance of
Emerging countries, in particular the rise of China, most likely influence the product
mix and thus affect consumer welfare gains from globalization.
We suggest that the global box office offers a convenient setting to examine the mecha-
nisms that link taste heterogeneity across countries to the product mix. Several reasons
make the international movies market particularly attractive for this exercise. Firstly,
studios produce and then distribute a single product with fixed observable characteris-
tics that is being released across multiple markets without (major) adjustment. Market
specific revenues and thus market shares are readily available and we collected a unique
and large dataset combining several online sources. To the extent that the dataset is com-
plete, the available product bundle (that is alternative movies released at the same time)
1The top 10 at the global box office in 2015 was as follows: 1. Star Wars: The Force Awakens (937 MM),
2. Jurassic World (652 MM), 3. Avengers: Age of Ultron (459 MM), 4. Inside Out (356 MM), 5. Furious 7
(353 MM), 6. Minions (336 MM), 7. The Hunger Games: Mockingjay - Part 2 (281 MM), 8. The Martian
(228 MM), 9. Cinderella (201 MM), 10. Spectre (200 MM)
2While market shares of identical products across countries could be informative about the taste for
specific characteristics of given products, differences in market structure and available product bundles
have made it difficult to directly estimate these differences. Furthermore, while trade data might be
available at a relatively high level of disaggregation even at the 8-digit level HS code there can still be
substantial heterogeneity in terms of product characteristics and quality.
110
can be readily constructed while the market structure is such that price competition
between movies at the boxoffice is of little importance. This implies that - conditional
on controlling for selective release of movies across markets - the covariation of market
shares across countries is informative about taste similarity between countries.
Our analysis proceeds in four steps: In a first step we present two stylized facts about
the global box office: (1) The share of sequels and adapted content has increased dra-
matically over recent decades, (2) the global movies market has experienced major shifts
away from the traditional ’Western’ target audience.
In a second step we use a random utility framework where we decompose the global
appeal of a product, i.e. movie, across all markets and the relative appeal between
markets by introducing an artificial taste space with fixed positions of countries where
market shares are decreasing in the distance between a movie from the location of indi-
vidual countries. This relative distance of countries is pinned down by the covariation
of market shares across movie observations and we estimate a two dimensional space
with all country locations from the box office revenues of more than 1000 movie released
since 2001. The framework is reminiscent of the address type models explored amongst
others by Anderson et al. (1989), but rather than mapping heterogeneity in demand into
observed characteristics we focus on unobservable heterogeneity.
In a third step we argue that studios make their production decision by picking loca-
tions in this abstract taste space, but face uncertainty in the form of a displacement
shock along the two dimensions of the taste space. The variance of the shock can be
estimated using a moment inequality approach focusing on movies that are - given
their production budget - ex post not profitable and determining the closest position for
which the movie would have had positive expected profits - the distance to the observed
position can be used to determine a lower bound for the variance of the displacement
shock. This procedure can also be implemented across movie types. We find substantial
uncertainty across all movie types, but less uncertainty for sequels which tend to be
more closely placed in the vicinity of their predecessors. This suggests that in a more
multi polar market sequels might be advantageous by reducing the ’spatial’ risk in the
abstract taste space.
Finally, we conduct counterfactuals by simulating the global revenue share of sequels in
the absence of changing market conditions.
This paper contributes to two literatures: The first being the traditional literature on
the movies market and cultural economics more broadly speaking as surveyed recently
by McKenzie (2012). We abstract from much of the usual features that are the center
111
of attention of other studies and instead focus on the interaction between the global
market place for movies, implied demand uncertainty and choice of type of movies in
an abstract yet tractable setting.
The second literature is a nascent literature on taste heterogeneity and supply in global
markets, where the closest study is a recent examination of the global cars market by
Coşar et al. (2018). They examine taste heterogeneity estimated in a BLP framework
with a particular focus on the question to what extent preferences for the home brand
can account for the home market effect commonly observed in the data. While they
focus on the home market effect, our focus is on understanding how shifts in global
markets affect products supplied to all markets.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section introduces the data and stylized facts,
section three introduces the quantitative model, the fourth section introduces the esti-
mation and finally section five presents the details of the simulation of movie markets
and describes the results for a counterfactual simulation of the movies market in the
absence of the rise of China. The final section concludes.
3.3 Data and Stylized Facts
Data We use data from BoxOfficeMojo which has information about the production
cost and the boxoffice revenues for a set of countries for each movie. A second data
source is TheNumbers which has detailed information about the source of the screen-
play of a movie, i.e. original screenplay, book adaptation. We use the “connections” sec-
tion from The Internet Movie Database to find the title and release year of sequels.
The sample period is 2001-2017. We exlude movies with missing information about
the production budget and no information about boxoffice revenue outside the US.
Finally we restrict our sample to movies that generated at least $80 million in boxoffice
revenue. The final dataset has 1009 movies including boxoffice revenue data from up to
59 countries. Table 3.1 shows summary statistics of our main variables. Out of the 254
sequels in our sample we are able to match 142 to their prequel3.
The left hand side graph in figure 3.1 shows that a higher production budget results in a
larger boxoffice revenue on average but the remaining uncertainty in movie production
is considerable. Film studios are using different ways to reduce this uncertainty. One
important way is to produce a movie based on a theme or story that has been successful
3Most unmatched sequels have a prequel released before our sample period starts
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previously. Examples of this “recycling” of content are remakes, sequels and adapta-
tions of books and TV series. In this paper we focus on sequels as a way to reduce
uncertainty. The right hand side graph in figure 3.1 compares the distribution of prof-
its for sequels and non-sequels. Sequels indeed reduce the risk for a loss and earn on
average a higher profit compared to non-sequels.
Stylized facts Our first stylized fact is shown on the left hand side graph in figure
3.2: between 2001 and 2017 the share of sequels in total boxoffice revenue has increased
from around 30 to almost 50%. When adding remakes and other non-original content
the increase is even more pronounced. At the same time the share of non-US boxoffice
revenue in total revenue increased from 40 to 65%. This is our second stylized fact. The
increase in the share of non-US boxoffice revenue comes from emerging countries. All
regions except Western Europe and other developped countries (Japan, South Korea,
Australia, New Zealand) become more important between 2001 and 2013 as shown in
figure 3.3. After 2013 the increase in the non-US revenue share is mainly due to the
increasing importance of Asia.
3.4 Model
We present a random utility framework where we decompose the global appeal of a
product, i.e. movie, across all markets and the relative appeal between markets by in-
troducing an artificial taste space with fixed positions of countries where market shares
are decreasing in the distance between a movie from the location of individual coun-
tries. This approach is closely related to the address based approach where both con-
sumers and products are represented by a location in a characteristic space and where
the consumers location pins down his optimal product as explored by - among others
- Anderson et al. (1989). On the supply side, firms choose their location in that charac-
teristics space. Rather than defining the dimensions of this space in terms of actually
observed characteristics, we map the observed demand patterns into an unobserved
heterogeneity space, which we call taste space.
3.4.1 Demand side
We posit a random utility model (RUM), where the utility of consumer i who chooses
product j (in our case a specific movie), is given by,
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where wi is the income of the consumer, pj the price of product, ξ j an unobservable
that is constant across all consumers. The error term is structurally decomposed into a
mean zero, double exponentially distributed error term , uij and a term that measures
the distance in a n-dimensional taste space whose dimensions are denoted by l, where
the vector cj denotes the position of the product and the vector ci the position of the
consumer. Consumers will be distributed around a midpoint for each given country as
described below. The utility is a decreasing function in the distance - that is the L1 norm
- between consumer and product location, where the sensitivity to the distance along
each dimension is measured by γ. The probability for consumer i to choose product j is
given by the following,
Pr(i, j) = Pr(uij > uik, ∀k 6= i)
which under symmetric prices (pi=pk) translates into,
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which assuming logit errors gives us the familiar reduced form for the probability of
consumer i choosing product j,
Pr(i, j) =
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The market share of product j across all the consumers in a given country c, that is the

















While for each individual consumer the independence of irrelevant alternatives prop-
erty holds, for the aggregate market share that is not the case. Specifically, the relative
market share of two products, depends on how they affect different consumers in the
consumer space individually, and how that aggregates. If a certain group of consumers
is already well provided for, with many products in their close vicinity, locating an addi-
tional product there might bring lower revenues, than serving a less competitive section
in the consumer space.
3.4.2 Supply side
There is a large number of entrepreneurs each endowed with a movie script. A movie
script, j, is defined by a triplet consisting of an expected location in the taste space,
c̃j, the production cost, bj, and the content type, that is a variable sj which assumes the
value 1 if the script is a sequel. Uncertainty comes from a taste shock for each dimension
where the vector of disturbances is denoted by ε j which is the difference between the
expected taste location of the script c̃j and the actualized - ex-post - taste location cj of
the movie, i.e.




ε ∼ G(0, Σsequel) iff sj = 1
ε ∼ G(0, Σno sequel) iff sj = 0
where the disturbance vector ε is drawn from a zero mean distribution that features
a lower variance if the script is a sequel rathern than a original script. In addition a
sequel’s taste location is linked to its prequel. We assume entrepreneurs to make no
mistake about the taste location of their script on average for both sequels and non-
sequels, which implies a zero mean disturbance. Entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and
maximize profits by making a discrete choice to produce a script if and only if expected
profits are positive, i.e.
Eπ(c̃j, bj, sj) ≥ 0
where Eπ((c̃j, bj, sj) refers to the expected profits of a script with expected location c̃j,
budget bj and of type sj. Each entrepreneur takes the location and production choice of
other entrepreneurs as given.
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3.5 Estimation
The estimation of the quantitative model proceeds in two steps. In a first step we
will exploit co-variance of revenue shares of movies across countries together with the
framework introduced above to estimate the relative location of countries towards each
other. In a second step we will then use a moment inequality approach to exploit the
assumption that only movies that are in expected terms profitable would have been
produced to back out the uncertainty in the taste space associated with the production
of different types of movies (notably, sequels vs non sequels).
3.5.1 Demand side
Estimation procedure We assume that consumers within a given country c, are dis-
tributed according to a normal distribution, with a fixed mean and variance, indepen-





c) f or i ∈ Ic
The model can then be estimated by simulated methods of moments. That is we sim-
ulate markets by drawing consumer locations given the mean and variance, and then
choose ξ j to minimise the distance between observed and market shares for the prod-
ucts within countries and across countries, that is we target scj for all j and for all c that
we observe. The objective to be minimized is as follows,
ηj,c,t
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Since we can only determine the relative distance between countries and thereby the
relative location of countries and movies in the taste space, some normalization is nec-
essary to obtain a well defined taste space and all positions. We normalize the space by
calibrating the γ parameters and choosing a location for the most important market -
that is the US.4
4For computational convenience we also impose lower and upper bounds and choose a value for γ
such that all countries are contained within that space. Effectively we estimate a two dimensional space
between 0 and 1 for both dimensions and assign the US the midpoint position at (.5, .5).
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Results The estimated taste space is depicted in figures 3.4 and 3.5. The figures present
the location of individual countries as well as simulated revenue contours for 2001
and 2017. Revenue contours are obtained by introducing a grid of location at which
we place homogenous movies with identical ξ j and production budget. The contours
can then be obtained by calculating the profit given the observed market size for each
country (i.e. the total observed box office revenues in a given year and country) for
each location along the grid and smoothing across them. The traditional and more
established markets are tightly clustered together in close proximity to the US market
at the mid point of the space. Asian markets cluster in the North-West quadrant of
the space. Asian markets and particularly China exert a pull on the profit space that
becomes visible at the end of the sample in 2017.
In figures 3.6 and 3.7 we furthermore map the revenue difference between a movie
at precisely the indicated location and the expected profit of a movie that is facing the
probability of a small disturbance into all directions. In the baseline year it is particularly
important to have precision in the center of the taste space to match exactly the most
important markets and not to lose market shares to competing movies - this creates an
advantage for sequels with potentially lower production uncertainty. Towards the end
of the sample in 2017 we observe that there are additional zones where lower variance
movies are advantageous, creating more demand for sequels. While this illustrates the
possibility for taste heterogeneity to create demand for lower variance products, the
quantitative impact depends on the precise size of different parameters, such as the
distance penalty parameter as well as the relative and absolute size of the shocks across
product groups.
We also obtain the taste locations of movies. We regress taste space coordinates of
movies on their observable characteristics. Table 3.3 shows that movies with high values
in the second taste dimension for example, tend to be IMAX format, Horror and Science-
fiction movies.
3.5.2 Supply side
We estimate Σ, the variance-covariance matrix of the taste shock, separately for sequels
and non-sequels. For sequels we compute the variance of the distance in the taste space
between each sequel and its prequel:
Σsequel = E[(csequel − cprequel)
2]
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For non-sequels we search for a sequence of taste shocks such that: first, the likelihood
of observing the actual taste location is maximized and second, expected profits at the
script location, i.e. actual location plus taste shock, are positive. We assume taste shocks
to be jointly normally distributed and to have zero covariance between taste dimen-
sions. Because only the absolute value of the distance between expected and actual
taste location matters for Σ we maximize the likelihood with respect to the distance d







where π(c̃i) refers to the expected profit at the initially chosen location, the constraint
requires the initial location to have expected positive profits5, and where Σ = E[d2] is
the implied variance-covariance matrix to be estimated.
Results The estimated variance along each dimension for both sequels and non se-
quels is reported in table 3.2. Sequels have substantially lower estimated production
uncertainty along both dimensions.
3.6 Simulation & Counterfactual
Sequels offer a trade off: They promise lower production uncertainty but at the price
of locating a movie close to the predecessor at what is potentially a less than optimal
location in the profit space. We argue that when market shares shift and the profit
space becomes riskier, then sequels might become more attractive than original produc-
tions, shifting the global product mix and the observed revenue share for that type of
product.
5More precisely, because the pdf is symmetric the sign of the difference between the realized taste and
the script location does not matter for the log likelihood, that is the actual constraint is as follows,
max(π(c̃+i , Σno sequel)], π(c̃
−
i , Σno sequel)]) ≥ 0
c̃+i = ci + d
c̃−i = ci − d
0 ≤ d2
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In this section we employ the quantitative model and estimated taste space to examine
that quesiton. We first describe how to simulate the model for a specific period, using
the estimated location of consumers of individual countries as well as the uncertainty of
sequels and non sequels as inputs and determining a set of movies that clears populates
the taste space and clears the market conditional on the market size and the arrival fre-
quency of sequels as script ideas. Secondly, we show how to use this approach to obtain
a simulated time series for the sequel revenue share that tracks the revenue share in the
data from the early 2000s to 2017. Finally, we demonstrate the counterfactual revenue
share if the distribution of income across countries would have remained constant at
2001 levels.
3.6.1 Static Simulation and Time Series
To simulate the movie market for a given period we take the country locations and
budgets as given. We start by drawing a large number6 of movie scripts which are
identical in their global appeal, and budget, i.e.
ξ j = ξ̄ ∀j
bj = b̄ ∀j
Scripts do however differ in their location across the taste space. The location of different
scripts is drawn uniformly along both dimensions of the space. We then iterate over
two steps: We first calculate the profits under the assumption that all scripts under
consideration are being produced and then we drop the movie with the largest losses.
We continue the iteration until all scripts have positive expected profits. Finally, we
draw the taste shocks and calculate ex post locations and profits.
With regard to sequels, we introduce a paramters µt that determines the share of scripts
that are sequels. In practice, this parameter is calibrated to match the observed revenue
share of sequels. For sequels, rather than drawing the location randomly, we select the
location from a previous successful (i.e. positive ex post profits) movie.
Using the evolution of country specific market sizes (that is the total box office revenue)
throughout the years, we generate year-by-year static simulations and backout a time
series for revenue share of sequels for the period under consideration.
6In practice, we take the observed number of movies and add 60 additional scripts.
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3.6.2 Counterfactual: Hollywood without China
To examine the impact of the changing composition of the global movies market we
simulate a counterfactual where we keep the market sizes at 2001 levels but feed in the
calibrated sequel script arrival share. The resulting time series is presented in figure
3.8. Surprisingly but consistent with the profit spaces depicted before, the shifts in
market sizes have not induced a higher production of sequels. While these movements
did tilt the product supply towards the asian markets, they did not increase spatial
risk and therefore did not shift production towards sequels. Sequels instead must have
other benefits that are orthogonal to the between country taste heterogeneity explored
here.
3.7 Conclusion
We propose a methodology to estimate taste similarity between countries and estimate
a taste space using a newly assembled data on international box office. As an applica-
tion we investigate how a dramatic change in the movie market structure, namely the
increasing importance of Emerging countries for the international boxoffice revenue,
can affect the mix of product types, in our case original movies and sequels. We show
first, that sequels have a lower production uncertainty and second, that the revenue
map has become steeper between 2001 and 2017 because of the the change in market
structure.
We also simulate the revenue share of sequels once with the actual and once holding
the movie market structure constant at the 2001 level. Our current results show only a
small influence of market structure on the share of sequels.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max P25 P50 P75
Production budget 1009 79.8 55.5 0 300 37 65 110
Total boxoffice 1009 272.1 248.8 52.8 2655.7 115.3 180 323
Profit 1009 192.3 218 -84.2 2418.7 67.1 117.9 227.2
Sequel 1009 .3
Notes: All variables in $ million. Production budget and total boxoffice from BoxOfficeMojo. Profit is
defined as Total boxoffice revenue minus production budget. Sequel is the revenue share of sequels.




non sequels 0.23 0.22 755
sequels 0.02 0.04 254
Table 3.3: Taste space coordinates regression
(1) (2)

















































Year FE Yes Yes
r2 0.252 0.206
N 981 981
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Regression of taste coordinates on observable movie characteristics: movie rating
(PG: parental guidance suggested, R: restricted), Oscar nominated or win, screen format
(IMAX, 3D, normal image), runtime in minutes and the genre of the movie.
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3.9 Figures
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Notes: Left hand side: Relation between log production budget and log total boxoffice revenue with a linear
fit in red Right hand side: Density of profits for sequels and non-sequels.
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Notes: Left hand side: boxoffice revenue share of sequels Right hand side: share of non-US boxoffice revenue
in total boxoffice revenue
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Notes: Share of worldwide boxoffice revenue by region. Other developed countries are: Japan, South
Korea, Australia and New Zealand.
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Figure 3.4: Estimated revenue space (2001)
Notes: Revenue map for 2001 in the taste space. Dots are the average taste locations of countries, assumed
to be constant over time, relative to the US which is normalized to be at taste position (0.5 0.5). Lines are
iso-revenue lines for the year 2001 assuming competitor movies on an evenly spaced grid.
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Figure 3.5: Estimated revenue space (2017)
Notes: Revenue map for 2017 in the taste space. Dots are the average taste locations of countries, assumed
to be constant over time, relative to the US which is normalized to be at taste position (0.5 0.5). Lines are
iso-revenue lines for the year 2017 assuming competitor movies on an evenly spaced grid.
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Figure 3.6: Expected revenue: Small vs large variance (2001)
Notes: Revenue map for 2001 in the taste space. Lines represent the difference between the revenue for
a movie precisely located at the taste location compared to a movie that faces the risk of a small “taste
shock” for the year 2001 assuming competitor movies on an evenly spaced grid. Dots are the average
taste locations of countries, assumed to be constant over time, relative to the US which is normalized to
be at taste position (0.5 0.5).
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Figure 3.7: Expected revenue: Small vs large variance (2017)
Notes: Revenue map for 2017 in the taste space. Lines represent the difference between the revenue for
a movie precisely located at the taste location compared to a movie that faces the risk of a small “taste
shock” for the year 2017 assuming competitor movies on an evenly spaced grid. Dots are the average
taste locations of countries, assumed to be constant over time, relative to the US which is normalized to
be at taste position (0.5 0.5).
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Figure 3.8: Counterfactual: Sequel revenue share
Notes: Simulation results: The blue line shows the smoothed sequel share of total revenue, the red line
corresponds to the sequel share of total revenue when market structure changes as in the data but using
simulated taste locations for movies (average over simulations), the yellow line shows the sequel share of
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